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0. Introduction  
The Badminton project (Bycatch and discards: Management INdicators, Trends and locatiON) aims at 
developing the knowledge of discard patterns and factors in European fisheries, evaluating the efficacy of 
selective devices and other discard management measures that have been implemented in the past and 
finally improving methods to analyse, monitor and manage bycatch (unwanted catches) and discards in 
European fisheries. 
WP4 focuses on the socio-economic and institutional factors that influence the discard behaviour of fishers. 
The first step in WP4 was to develop a framework seeing discard as a result of fisher behaviour embedded 
in institutional context, which influences the behaviour. This was developed in the working paper D1 in the 
project (Eliasen and Christensen 2012). This paper describes how the developed framework has been used 
for implementing three case studies of trawl fishery to get a deeper understanding of the fishers’ discard 
behaviour and thereby discard levels and patterns. The results are further summarised in an article with 
focus on the evaluation of the framework which is expected to be published in the ICES journal of Marine 
Science.  
This working paper consists of three parts:  
• A description of the methodology of case studies (based on working paper XX);  
o The list of factors influencing discard behaviour, which has structured the focus of the case 
studies 
o Description of the methodology used for the case studies, especially the interview method.  
 
• Link to appendices containing descriptions of the three cases from Denmark, Greece and England. 
  
• A discussion of general findings across the three case studies and an evaluation of the list of factors 
which potentially influences discard behaviour. 
 
 
1. Methodology  
The list of potential factors influencing discard behaviour 
The basis for the case studies is an understanding of discard as a by-product of the fishing process. The 
process of discarding takes place in the sorting process on the vessels. What are caught are (partly) a result 
of choices made earlier in the fishing process and right up to the trip (choice of gear, fishing place and time 
etc.) as well as the strategic choices (choice of vessel, investments in quotas and catches and dealing with 
the equipment etc.). Therefore the discard level and patterns partly depend on the behaviour of the fisher. 
The behaviour is seen as a result of individual choices which are embedded in the institutional orders of 
Community, State, and Market and under the external conditions; natural and fleet structures etc., which in 
the short run for the individual is as external as the natural conditions (Apostle et Al. 1998, Scott 1995). 
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Figure 1: The model of the institutional embedded fishing practice. Fishing practise embedded in the 
Community, State, Market interrelation and the structural and natural conditions.  
 
 
Departing from this approach a list of specific factors that potentially can influence the behaviour leading to 
discard in the fishing process is developed. 
 
Figure 2: Specified list of factors which potentially influence the discard and selective behaviours. 
Main area General factors Specific factors 
Natural 
conditions 
Stock related 
conditions 
Mixed/single species fishery 
Natural changes in stock availability  
Condition for the 
fishing process 
Seabed and other physical conditions 
Weather conditions 
Structural conditions – 
fleet structure 
Fixed investments in vessels (and partly equipment)  
Community  Dominant norms 
regarding discard 
General view of discard 
Institutional knowledge regarding volumes, consequences 
etc. of the discard 
Social norm enforcement 
Identity The fishers’ perceived roles in relation to the management 
system  
Learning The fishers´ interpretation of the management system and 
dialogues with the management regarding the discard 
Individual and collective initiatives to learn 
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State Regulations and 
measurements 
Input/output regulation  
Technical measures (including spatio-temporal closures) 
Decision rules and 
procedures 
Legitimacy of the fisheries regulation 
 
Communication 
structures 
Formal and informal forums 
Communication “climate”  - dialogue/position marking 
Control and 
enforcement 
Interpretation of strength of control and enforcement 
Level of registered non-compliance 
Market   
 
Economic incentives Market prices 
Interpretation of market pressure for certain "qualities" 
Tactical investments in 
technology 
Fishing gear/equipment for tracing, handling and storing 
 
The list of factors has been used as a check list for a study of fishers´ interpretation and behaviours in 
regard to discard in the cases studies in Denmark, Greece and England. In the same process the relevance 
of the specific factors of the list has been tested. 
Empirical basis for the case studies 
In each case study, the specific factors of the list have been examined to see if, in this case, it has 
functioned as a driver for discard.  
Some of the factors could be examined based on data available in desk studies: the scientific knowledge 
about the natural condition for the specific fishery (the mix of species and sizes and areas of appearance), 
the regulation of the fishery (the general mechanisms and specific measures for reducing the discard as 
gear specifications, closed areas etc.), and the general market conditions of the fishery. Further, to some 
extent the composition of the fleet and general use of the gear and fishing places are registered and 
available. Besides the framework conditions the desk research further documented parts of the 
behavioural outcome; e.g. compliance through registered violation of regulations as well as information on 
local history, organisations etc. which contribute to the understanding of norms and cognitive institutions 
among the fishers.  
The registered discard from observations and test fisheries should work as background data. In the 
interview situation it should also have been used for getting a bit deeper into the question of discard, which 
in many relations is a political delicate question. By being open to the fishers’ views on discard practise and 
then confront the fishers with the official discard data and thereby get the fishers’ interpretation of the 
data. 
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Unfortunately it turned out that there were important time lacks in the discard data. Given the changed 
regulations and context the official available discard data was not useful for discussion of the present 
practice and any changes in this:   
• In Greece the collection of discard data according to Data Collection Framework (DCF) for the 
Common Fisheries Policy stopped in 2008. 
• In Denmark discard data is collected on a continuous basis. But the processing time is long and the 
latest approved data set for discard in Kattegat is from the year 2008. Taken into consideration the 
important changed in the fisheries and the regulation between 2008 and 2011/2012 (where the 
interviews were conducted) discard data was useless as a tool to confront the words of the fishers 
on discard practices and the registered data. 
 
Not only has the project team regretted the lack of recent data; also the fishers would have likes to be able 
to document the claimed changes in discard practices.  
 
1.1 The interview method 
The desk research provided data of some of the factors. But more qualitative methods should be used to 
understand the fishers’ perceptions and behaviour. Personal interviews have been the main input in regard 
to fisher behaviour and assessments in the Danish and Greek case, while the desk research mainly provided 
background and contextual information. In the English case three reports of interviews with fishers in NE, 
MW and SE England were used as the source. The interviews have been conducted by the researcher, 
mainly in one-to-one relation (as a group interview in one occasion).  The interviews lasted 1-2 hours and 
were based on a semi-structured interview guide, which was slightly adjusted to the situation and 
developed on a few points during the process. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The 
interviews were evaluated for any new information (concepts, reasoning etc.) and perspectives in the 
answering of the overall research question. The interview summaries were sent for comments to the 
interview person and discussed in a following telephone conversation where supplementary questions 
were discussed as well.  
There are often discrepancies between words and actual behaviour (Schein 2004). Participant observation 
over time could solve this, but it is too costly for this context and interviews are used instead. The 
methodology of a single interview with each person (and in some cases telephone based re-interview) for 
1-2 hours, and an eye for observation of general behaviour, attributes etc. during the interview visit allow a 
relative good insight into the fisher’s view on his and his fellow fishers’ fishing practices. The individual 
interview, combined with a range of interviews with fishers in the same fishery as well as written 
documentation of fisher behaviour (scientific reports, management reports, newspaper articles etc.) is 
assessed to provide solid information on the fishers’ behaviour and considerations in relation to discard 
behaviour.  
Nevertheless some of the theoretical identified potential incentives from the framework list, especially in 
the community sphere, are more or less intangible and tacit, maybe even invisible for the fisher embedded 
in the specific social context. Therefore it is most likely that the general view of discard, social norms in this 
regard and especially the social norm enforcement could be further developed using another methods with 
a higher degree of observation. A deeper knowledge about local social norms and mechanisms would 
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strengthen the basis for implementation. But as the social norms expectably are quite local specific a larger 
numbers of studies should be done to support implementation for larger areas. Such numbers of studies is 
outside the range of this project.  A basis for such deeper study could be a socio-economic database of 
fishing communities, as proposed by the North Sea Women’s Network (2007) based on their study: 
“Developing a socio-economic dataframe”. 
  
 
2. The case studies 
The case studies are attached to this report as separate appendices. 
2.1 The Danish case study 
Appendix 1 
2.2 The Greek case study 
Appendix 2  
2.3 The English case 
Appendix 3 
 
 
3. Discussion  
Finally based on analysis of the case studies we will discuss findings across the three case studies and 
evaluate the list of factors which potentially influences discard behaviour. 
3.1 Analysis of the case studies 
The case study description is structured by the list of factors. The specific factors are described under the 
main areas – Natural conditions, State, Community and Market. For the specific factors which appeared in 
the data (desk research and interviews) the way they influence the behaviour is described and discussed.  
The influence of the factors is summarised in a table where the factors are divided into main areas and how 
they drive for a high discard behaviour or a selective (or lower than average) discard behaviour. The tables 
show which factors influence the discard behaviour (and how), though not in any way assessed in a 
quantitative way. Besides summarising the influential factors in each case, these tables were used for 
discussing the relevance of the elements (the specific factors) of the list. 
The purpose of the cross case analysis was to find similarities or differences in the behaviour and the 
patterns of interrelation between factors. A direct comparison would not be relevant given the differences 
in geographical, historical and cultural contexts and management systems in use. In this case a comparison 
of which and especially how the factors influence discard behaviour combined with a more holistic reading 
of the case descriptions gave basis for finding patterns across the cases.    
3.2 General cross case findings  
When adding the case studies it is obvious that factors from all four main areas; natural conditions as well 
as community, state/regulative and market had important influence at the discard level and pattern. But at 
the level of specific factors the context dependency is evident; No quota related discard in Greece because 
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quotas are not in use in the Mediterranean Sea. Discard problems in the mentioned English fisheries 
related to catch composition rules and mismatch between quota and abundance for whiting, which was not 
mentioned in the other cases etc. Despite the differences in context there are similarities and patterns in 
the interrelation of factors which can provide general experiences.  
The cases showed a lack of a common definition of what the discard problem is. There is not necessarily 
fully accordance between the fishers, not even within each case. Further the fishers have no clear 
understanding of what is meant by discard, when the management system or general public urge them to 
reduce or ban discard. In Greece the fishers hardly saw discard as an issue, while in England and Denmark 
discard was a focus point also because it is a hot political topic and an issue in the recovering plans. Still in 
England and Denmark the fishers only see certain fragments of the discard as a problem – an 
understanding that can differ from other stakeholders like politicians and Green NGO´s. A common 
understanding of what the discard problem is – or at least clarity of the positions – is probably a 
precondition for cooperation towards a reduction of discard. 
The fishers perception of what the discard problem is highly, but not only, formed by a market perspective; 
discard of fish which could be sold is waste. This is the signal from especially the English fishers and can be 
seen in Greece, where market and enforcement conditions allow landing and selling of fish also under 
minimum landing sizes. The discard of small individuals of commercial species is also often seen as a 
problem, thus for the future fishery. The fishers’ views on the rest of the discard fractions in an ecological 
perspective are more complex. Some fishers have some consideration of this as a disturbance of the 
ecological balance, but they often see other factors as equally important for this balance; consequences of 
other fishery activities, pollution from land or sea, invasive species etc. Other fishers see the catch and 
discard of some species as a way to reduce the predators of competitors to the commercial species, and 
maybe even see the discard as a way to feed the commercial species (nephrops).  
The fishers in the English and Danish cases have taken initiatives to develop new regulation tools as well as 
new gear, with higher selectivity as one of the goals. The same type of fisher initiatives regarding discard 
and selectivity have not been reported from Greece. The explanation is probably mainly the political and 
managerial focus on discard. While there is a limited focus on discard in Greece it is an important political 
issue in England and Denmark and an important element in the recovering plans in these two countries. 
Among other things by addressing reduction of unwanted catches and discard the fishers try to avoid 
regulative measures which can threaten their fishery e.g. large closed areas, strong limitation of days-at-sea 
etc.  
Looking at the cases finally illustrates that the effect of one factor often depends on the interrelation with 
other factors. In the Danish case the discard problem of nephrops was due to a mismatch between 
minimum landing size (MLS) and the actual mesh size leading to discard of under-MLS nephrops. The exact 
level of discard is not clear as discard data does not yet cover the more selective trawls enforced in the last 
couple of years. The current MLS is supported by the fishers despite the discard level, as they fear the 
market will erode if the small nephrops reach the market. Further the Danish nephrops fishery showed a 
low nominal level of discard of cod (which is in focus for most of the Kattegat regulation). This is a result of 
both a low abundance of cod to the quota and to the transferability of quotas which allows the fishers in an 
easy way to buy supplementing quota rights if necessary. The English case covers three fisheries with 
different problems; though the most important discard problems were discard of especially whiting due to 
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a mismatch between stock abundance and quotas. The lack of total quota means that even a well-
functioning quota market cannot reduce the discard level. Further catch composition rules resulted in 
discard of fish which the fishers had quota for, if caught in a wrong combination of species. In the Greek 
case discard was hardly felt as a problem – for fishers or public. Apparently there was a low discard level for 
all marketable species as the market in general accepts small sized fish (even below the MLS). A low level of 
control and enforcement of the MLS regulation meant that the discard of marketable species was an 
insignificant problem, whereas non-marketable fish was discarded. These examples show that the specific 
interrelation between stock situation, regulation and market leads to the specific pattern; MLS is wanted by 
the fishers in Denmark and not respected in Greece due to the market in both cases. Transferability of 
quota rights reduces quota related discard in the Danish case, but cannot in the English cases due to 
sufficient total quota in one case and not in the other. Therefore, the interaction between case specific 
factors from the three spheres will, if ignored in the process of developing mitigating measures, make the 
final outcome of the measures unpredictable. A specific measure in isolation tends to create a certain 
incentive. But other factors can strengthen the incentive or counteract it. 
 
 
4. Evaluation of the framework list of factors 
The framework of the case studies was the list of factors which potentially influences the discard behaviour 
of the fishers. By focusing on behaviour we see the fisher not as an instrument for drivers, but as an actor 
in developing the specific fishery and therefore also discard pattern. The factors of the list are therefore 
both institutionalised incentives leading to certain behaviour and framework in which new mitigating 
measures will work. The factors influence can lead to different types of behaviour, but could potentially be 
used for the purpose of this context; to develop mitigating measures to reduce discard. As a tool for 
mitigating discard the list should therefore be seen as a checklist in an analysis of possible drivers for each 
specific situation. The list is evaluated based on the three case studies; especially the summarising tables in 
the description indicating which specific factors influence discard behaviour in a higher or lower direction. 
It is seen that the importance of the individual factor had a varying importance between the selected cases. 
In these cases some of the factors have not been seen as influential factors. As the cases are not 
representative for all fisheries, they might have influence in other cases (not studied here) or they might 
even just need other more anthropological methods to be identified as influential. Therefore the list should 
be further developed when used in other cases.  
The specified factors of the natural conditions were seen in most cases. A higher focus on the actual fishing 
practice, including observations at sea may have developed the importance of e.g. weather conditions, 
which were hardly mentioned as important for discard. Based on the present data we cannot say if weather 
conditions could be decisive or just a marginal factor.  
The community factors played important though more intangible roles in the cases. As mentioned the 
norms regarding discard influence the practice, but they would also be the basis for mitigating measures or 
actions. The norm regards the understanding of which fractions of the discarded material the fishers see as 
a problem and what is not seen as such. Another aspect concerns the strength of the dominant norm; if it 
has been developed to a tacit level or there are explicit conflicts in defining the norm, seen as social 
enforcement of the norm on norm-breakers. In the cases no examples of social enforcement in regard to 
discard were mentioned, although there could be such examples only hidden for the interviewing 
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“stranger”. The identity in relation to the management system is a background factor rather than a direct 
factor on discard behaviour as no one sees themselves as “discarders” or “non-discarders”. In these cases 
the focus on identity revealed that the fishers did not see themselves in total opposition to the 
management system. Those seeing themselves as real partners to the authorities had an expectation of 
being able to make agreements on implementation of certain measures that the fishers would comply to 
and afterwards evaluate before new were introduced. They were often disappointed due to a flow of new 
measures. The learning factor could lead to a higher or lower discard level – depending on the learning and 
knowledge focus. Many of the interviewed persons had participated in research fisheries with scientists 
and used phrases and arguments from science in describing their understanding of the sea ecosystems and 
the influence of fishing and other activities. This learning enables a beginning convergence between fishers 
and scientists and forms a possible basis for dialogue on discard issues. At the collective level there were 
examples in England and Denmark of fisher initiatives to develop new selective gear and new management 
systems which included fisher responsibility to adjust the fisheries in order to avoid certain types of 
unwanted catches and discard. No such initiatives regarding discard were reported from Greece. The 
specific factors within the community main area therefore seem to be relevant for understanding the 
background of discard behaviour and not least the context for implementation of mitigating measures. 
The state factors focus on the formal institutional structures as well as the interpretation of these. It is 
obvious that choice of input or output regulation influences discard patterns, as there is no quota related 
discard in an input system. Also the technical measures influence discard patterns; the cases revealed 
several examples of discard initiated by technical measures as catch composition rules, minimum landed 
size regulation etc. The Greek case though showed that a low acceptance to the MLS rule, combined with 
low enforcement (and a good market condition for small fish) resulted in low MLS related discard of 
marketable fish. Thereby also decision rules, especially the legitimacy of the regulation as well as the 
control and enforcement status have shown to influence the actual discard level and behaviour. The 
communication structures enable dialogue and learning regarding discard. The informal forums are 
constituted by the interaction between fishers and authorities in control or scientists in research fisheries. 
The formal forums are at an organisational level, where fishers’ organisations participate in advisory panels 
etc. The communication structures thus seem to influence discard indirectly only by function as a way to 
communicate understandings of ecosystems and discard (as well as other topics) between the fishers and 
managers/scientists. As a tool for mitigating measures the formal and informal communication structures 
could be of importance for developing and implementing discard reducing initiatives.  
Finally the market factors are of high importance for the discard level and behaviour. Clearly the fishers 
wanted to discard the parts of the catch which could not be landed and sold without a loss. The case 
studies showed that not only market prices (at auctions or other types of markets) are of importance. 
Factors as the risk related to strong fluctuating prices and not least costs influence the fisher behaviour. 
The direct costs of handling, landing and selling the catch were considered, but also indirect costs as the 
work load of handling low priced or small quantities of fish which would only bring a low net income. It is 
not clear how important the interpretation of risk and indirect costs is for the discard behaviour. Never the 
less the specific factor should be “interpreted income from marketing the catch fractions” rather than just 
markets prices. Surprisingly the market pressure for certified fish eventually caught under low discard was 
not mentioned in the cases as a factor behind changed behaviour, though it might be seen as a part of the 
public pressure on the fishers in general. The factor of technical investments seems very relevant as the 
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trawl types are a commonly used technical measure in order to reduce discard. Other factors as tracing 
equipment and storing capacity were not mentioned in the cases as factors behind discard, but could 
eventually turn out to be influential if the interviews or observations had been even more focussed on the 
actual fishing practice, as the effect of tracing equipment is natural and therefore tacit for the fisher. 
Several fishers pointed out that the importance of sharing experiences of good fishing places within the 
group was very important though. Some fishers declared that in order to limit sorting time and effort they 
preferred some areas with less unwanted catch. Some of the specific factors of the market area should be 
reformulated and others should be further surveyed to assess the level of importance for the fisher 
behaviour. Nevertheless all factors in this main area seem to be relevant, though with adjustment of the 
formulations.  
As a conclusion the list highlights factors that in isolation, but especially in combination, influence discard 
level and behaviour. Some factors directly influence the present behaviour, while others set a framework 
for an actual behaviour and the basis for any fisher involvement and active role in an attempt to develop 
and implement mitigating measures. Some of the specific factors of the list have had less importance in the 
three case studies (social norm enforcement, handling and storing capacity), but could have been 
important elsewhere. Using the list in the case studies also illustrates that some of the factors should be 
further developed; clarifying the discard/discard problem definitions among the stakeholders, the price 
factor should include interpretation of the market and potential net income as this is what influences the 
discard behaviour. The list therefore should be further developed and validated through use in other case 
studies or use in preparation or implementation of mitigating measures.  
For development of mitigating measures the above demonstrates the importance of taking the factors 
mentioned into consideration, in isolation as well as the possible effect of interrelation between two or 
more factors.  
• Across the cases all main factors are of importance for discard behaviour. But not all factors have 
influence on all cases.  
• Even though the same factors influence the discard behaviour in the cases, the outcome depends 
of the specific interrelation between the specific effects of the factors.  
 
For pre-assessments, evaluations or development of mitigating measures, the whole range of potential 
influential factors should be included in an analysis. 
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Introduction and summary 
The case description is structured around the list of factors which might function as drivers for the discards 
and selective behaviours. As the real world is more holistic than the analytic categories some theoretical 
identified factors are discussed more than once.   
The data for the case study origin from desk research, to some degree from conclusions from previous work 
packages of the Badminton project and personal interviews with fishers and from 4 ports around Kattegat; 
Vesterø and Østerby (both at the Island of Læsø), Strandby and Gilleleje (in total 14 fishers including the 
auction leader). 
The interviewees are chosen in corporation with the chairman of the local Fishermen’s Association. The 
fishers are all trawlers with their main activity in nephrops fishery in Kattegat. Several of the fishers 
participate occasionally in research related fishery (test of trawl, stock assessment or discard observations). 
Most interviews took place in the fishers’ private homes or in the facilities at the port. The interviews lasted 
1-2 hours. In one case we chose to have a group interview with three fishers, the chairman of the local 
Fishermen´s association and the leader of the local auction. In most cases (depending on the agreement 
with the interview person) the summary of the interview was sent for comment to the interview person 
and discussed in a following telephone conversation where supplementing questions were discussed as 
well.  
 
 
Summary: The most important factors  
The identified factors function as drivers behind the discard behaviour. Some factors drives in a certain 
direction in regard discard level. For others the direction is strongly influenced by the context, the 
interaction with other factors. The table below summarises the findings from the case study, distributed on 
the natural conditions as well as the three types of institutions (state, community, market). It is briefly 
mentioned how the factors contribute to behaviour of high discard level or selective/low-discard 
behaviour. 
Table 1: Summary of factors driving toward a higher or lower discard level. 
 Drivers for high discard behaviour Drivers for selective/low(er) discard 
behaviour 
Natural 
conditions 
*Mixed fishery – unavoidable catch of 
unwanted species or sizes 
*Bottom trawling – relative high level of 
unwanted catch 
 
State *MLS regulation and landing ban of 
undersized 
*Landing and administrative control – 
low possibilities for black/undersized 
landings 
*0-quotas for protected species 
*Transferable quotas and quota pool enable 
buying/renting supplementing quota for 
marketable non-target catch 
*Sufficient cod-quota to actual abundance 
*Compulsory use of selective gear 
Market *Low prices on certain flatfish 
(unmarketable) 
*High cost (money and effort) on landing 
of low volumes relative to auction prices 
*Lowering cost (in money and effort), by 
avoiding unwanted catch and sorting 
*Buying/renting supplementing quota reduce 
high grading 
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*Eventually local black markets for undersized 
nephrops (not documented) 
Community *View on discards 
   - Some of it is OK - feeding nephrops 
   - Catch of unwanted species and sizes is 
partly due to unbalanced fishing pressure 
based on “stupid” regulation 
*Feeling of being unable to fulfil all 
regulations anyway – a risk of a loose 
relation to compliance 
*Interest in trying new (and selective) gear  
*View on discards 
   - High grading (over MLS marketable fish) is 
waste 
* Wish to be legal in everyday practice 
* Informal sharing of knowledge of fishing 
grounds with high unwanted catch (partly) 
* Initiatives to develop locally adjusted 
management systems (effort 
regulation/selective behaviour – so far failed) 
 
Natural conditions for the Kattegat nephrops trawl fishery:  
Kattegat is a minor sea area between Denmark and Sweden (30.000 square kilometres). Kattegat is ICES 
area IIIaS, while Skagerrak is IIIaN, together area IIIa.  
 
 
Source: ICES Statistical areas, ICES 
 
 
The main commercial species in the Kattegat is nephrops, sole, herring, lumpfish, brill, plaice, turbot and 
cod, which totals more than 95 % of the landing values. But 51 species with Kattegat as origin is registered 
landed in Danish ports in 2011. It is therefore a relatively mixed fishery.  
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The registered discard situation 
The last available discard data for Kattegat covers the period 1998-2008.The Kattegat data are processed by 
DTU-Aqua. In this regard the data origin from the DTU-Aqua contribution to the Badminton project (Imares 
2010). Appendix 1 below shows discard for all discard data for four types of fisheries. The nephrops trawl 
fishery is the main part of the “OTB-CRU“; the first row in column in the discard table, the bottom otter 
trawl for crustaceans. The data do not inform about the reason to discard; it is not specified which parts of 
the discard are below or over the Minimum Landing Size, or if over-MLS sizes are discarded due to  lack of 
quota, low prices or due to damaged fish. But the relation between number of individuals and weight gives 
an indication of the general pattern of discards.  
Table 2: Summary of the mean numbers (Nb) and weights (Wt, in kg) of selected species per hour per trip 
for nephrops trawl (the bottom otter trawl for crustaceans) for Kattegat (IIIa, IIIn) based on data 1998-
2008.  
 Discard Landing 
No Wt (kg) No Wt kg 
Total kg/h/trip 1189,2 63,1 352,7 72,1 
Of this: 
  Nephrops 
873 20,9 288,7 16,4 
  Cod  29,5 8,8 4,2 8 
  Saithe 9,7 7,7 21,9 28,2 
  Haddock 27,2 5,1 7 4,8 
 American plaice 
(Hårising)  
97,4 4,7 0,1 0 
  Dab 54,9 3,4 1,4 0,4 
 
These six species cover more than 80 % of the registered discards from 1998-2008. Based on the average 
weight of the discarded individuals, the discards seem mainly to be undersized individuals. The exception is 
saithe, where the difference between average weights for landed and discarded is below a factor 2. This 
indicates a possible discard due to lack of quota.  
It is important to note that these data covers the period 1998-2008. As seen below the regulation on closed 
areas and gear use has changed considerably in the last years. Therefore the fishers claim the current level 
of discards is lower than the registered – and probably a different pattern. This is supported by the latest 
and not yet processed discard data (according to personal information with DTU Aqua). 
 
 
The fleet 
The dominant commercial fleet fishing for nephrops in Kattegat is minor trawlers of 10-18 m in total length. 
The crew often consists of 1-4 crew members including the skipper. The trawlers often also hold quota for 
fisheries in Skagerrak or the North Sea (for fishers in the northern part) or in the Baltic Sea (fishers in the 
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southern part of Kattegat). For most of the Kattegat fishers, nephrops is the main fishing activity and 
income source.  
Figure 1: 2 Kattegat nephrops trawlers; H79 Tiki (steel 17 m) and FN272 Tina Malene (wood 14 m),  
 
Source Fiskerforum.dk /MC and /G. Vejen 
 
In Kattegat both side trawlers and stern trawlers are used. In 2011 53 trawlers was registered in the four 
ports investigated, half of them side and half of them stern trawlers. The length of the vessels differs; 6 are 
below 12 meters, 14 vessels are 12- 15 meters, 20 are 15-20 meter and 14 vessels are over 20 meter. In 
general the vessels are relative old. In the last years, the investments seem to have focused on buying up 
old vessels with quotas. In that case the best vessel (often the newest) is used for fishery, while the other is 
sold or scrapped.  
Generally the crew members are paid by shares of the landing value. The specific shares differ between the 
vessels. Not least the huge investments in vessels and quota have led to a larger share “to the boat” and 
similar less share of the total landing value to be shared among the crew. An example was given: First the 
cost of oil is subtracted from the total landing value from the specific trip with the nephrops trawler. Of the 
rest 55 % is allocated to the vessel. The rest (45 % ex. oil) is shared between the three crew members (in 
this case the owner was skipper and therefore one of the members). 
 
 
State: The regulation of the Kattegat trawl fishery   
The Kattegat trawl fishery is regulated by the general EU regulation based on quotas, later supplemented 
by effort (days-at-sea). A range of technical measures are in use; minimum landing sizes (MLS), detailed 
gear restrictions, closed areas (temporary and more permanent) etc. Regarding discards the fishers are 
obliged to discard fish under MLS and fish for which they do not have quota. At the other hand they are 
obliged to land fish over MLS for which they have quota (ban to high grading).  
First, the section focuses on the quota regulation. Second the cod recovery plans will be presented with the 
different regulative measures they consist of. Finally the fishers’ general considerations regarding control 
and legitimacy of the regulations system will be discussed.  
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Catch and quota development  
From 2000 to 2011 there have been important changes in quotas allocated to Danish fishers in Kattegat. 
The cod quota was in 2001 only 3 % of the quota in 2000, whereas the quota for nephrops has remained 
stable and higher for some years.  
Table 3: Quotas for Kattegat*, selected years and species, in tons.  
Quota (t) 2000 2005 2008 2010 2011 
Nephrops 3665 3454 4039 4197 3800 
Plaice 2490 1691 2131 2039 1769 
Cod 4320 615 465 270 118 
Sole  865 803 869 664 704 
*The quota for nephrops and sole is for Kattegat and the EU-u-zone of the Baltic (ICES 3A/BCD). Quotas for 
plaice and cod is Kattegat (ICES 3AS) only. 
Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery 2001, 2006, 2009, 2011, table 2.2.  
The registered catch shows an even higher importance of the nephrops as the quota for cod and plaice is 
only used at a low level in 2010-2011 (20 and 41 % respectively), Figure 2. There has been a clear change in 
the catches towards dedicated nephrops fishery. 
Figure 2: Catches (landings) for Kattegat*, selected years and species, in tons.  
 
*The quota for nephrops and sole is for Kattegat and the EU-zone of the Baltic (ICES IIIA/BCD). Quotas for 
plaice and cod is only Kattegat (ICES IIIAS). 
Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery 2001, 2006, 2009, 2011, table 2.2.  
Vessel Transferable Quotas in the demersal fishery 
Based on experiences from an ITQ system in the pelagic fishery, the so called Vessel Transferable Quota 
Share system (VTQ) was introduced in the demersal fisheries in 2007. The quota shares was allocated freely 
to the vessels (and their owners) based on a 3-year historical record. The quota shares can only be sold 
with the vessel. However, this limitation has been loosened during the last years as part of the quota can 
now be sold independently of the vessel. The new owner can transfer the quota to another fishing vessel in 
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his possession. If the vessel is purchased by more than one person, the quota can be split between the 
buyers. The transferability of quotas to other vessels has led to a considerable reduction in the active fleet 
(Eliasen et al. 2009). 
As a part of the VTQ system a new institution, the VTQ pools, was introduced. The fishers can on pool their 
quotas on a voluntary basis, and they can be transferred in swaps, leasing or lending arrangements 
between vessels belonging to the same pool group. The exchange arrangements are relative simple within 
the pool. The VTQ-pools use an on-line system to conduct trades (puljefiskeri.dk). Together with private 
brokerages, this provides an efficient market in which the government does not participate (Alexander 
2011). 
Quota related discard 
As noted in the working paper and in the WP 3 reports, one of the possible drivers for discards is quota 
related discards. This is either legal (obligatory) discards if the fisher has no quota for the specific species or 
illegal discards (high grading) of fish which can be legally landed, but of various reasons is low priced. High 
grading is a way to get a higher average price for the available quota. In both cases a mismatch between 
the catch and the quota drives the discard behaviour. High grading of other than quota reasons will be 
discussed in the section regarding market drivers. 
All the interviewed nephrops fishers claimed they had sufficient quota or were able to rent more within the 
quota pool, if needed. As they did not expect to reach their individual quota level for (almost) any species, 
there is no incentive to discard fish over the minimum landing size – due to lack of quota or to optimise the 
income from the individual quota; all catches over MLS could be landed and sold. Especially for flounder 
this is not always the case, as described in the market section below. 
The claim by the fishers that quota is not a limitation and driver for discards, is generally supported by the 
official registration of use of quotas for vessels under the FKA system. As seen in the tables below, only 78 
% of the nephrops quota for Kattegat, Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea was used in 2011. No quota pools were 
near a full use. This means that the fishers were not forced to discard nephrops due to lack of quotas. At 
least they had the opportunity to rent the necessary quota.  
Table 4: Registered use of nephrops quota in Kattegat, Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea 2011. Quota pools. 
Quota pool Share 0/00 Total 
quota kg 
Registered 
catch kg 
Unused 
quota kg 
Unused 
quota % 
6618 - Hanstholm 
Puljeselskab Aps 
402,28 1.451.099 1.182.589 268.510 19 
6619 - Foreningen 
StrandbyPuljen pulje 1 
306,26 1.034.750 811.263 223.487 22 
6630 - Bælternes Puljefiskeri 93,55 367.252 278.834 88.418 24 
6637 - Skagen 
Fiskeriforening 
73,39 253.887 180.578 73.309 29 
6658 - Læsø Fiskeindustri 81,27 298.544 211.641 86.903 29 
6660 - Dansk Puljefiskeri 75,44 289.544 217.941 71.603 25 
All quota pools 1032,19 3.695.076 2.882.846 812.230 22 
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Table 5: Registered use of cod quota in Kattegat 2011. Quota pools. 
Quota pool Share 0/00 Total 
quota kg 
Registered 
catch kg 
Unused 
quota kg 
Unused 
quota % 
6618 - Hanstholm 
Puljeselskab Aps 
477,65 55.327 38.516 16.811 30 
6619 - Foreningen 
StrandbyPuljen pulje 1 
243,34 31.253 25.164 6.089 19 
6630 - Bælternes Puljefiskeri 92,01 11.567 6.873 4.694 41 
6637 - Skagen 
Fiskeriforening 
43,42 6.555 3.300 3.255 50 
6658 - Læsø Fiskeindustri 70,84 11.019 8.453 2.566 23 
6660 - Dansk Puljefiskeri 72,28 6.698 5.698 1.000 15 
All quota pools 999,54 122.419 88.004 34.415 28 
Source: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 2012, IOK- og FKA-fartøjers andele og landinger.  
For cod, which is the target for the protection measures, it is more or less the same picture as for nephrops. 
Only 72 % of the quota is fished, no quota pool is close to a full use of the available quota within the pool. 
Still the fishers emphasise that even today the quotas are so small for many vessels that even a single 
trawl haul could take the cod quota for a whole year, if the trawl by “accident” hits an area with many cods. 
A fisher gave an example showing this and the low importance of the cod in the total fishery: Last year the 
vessel caught 17,000 kg nephrops and 1,300 kg cod. This was caught during 160 days-at-sea with 3-4 hauls 
a day - an average of less than 3 kg cod pr. haul. This vessel only held a 900 kg quota for cod this year. The 
quota for the remaining 400 kg cod was rented from other members of the quota pool.    
A further reduction of the quota to a close-to-zero quota could, according to the fishers, lead to the 
discards of cod only based on accidental catch. This is what the fishers realise today for the spurdog which 
has a 0- quota in Kattegat. There are occasional occurrences and accidental catches of spurdogs in the area. 
The fishers were angry at a system where good and high priced fish had to be discarded because no catch 
and landing is allowed at all. 
Other species are registered for larger areas; haddock for Kattegat, Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea, and saithe 
for the North Sea, Kattegat, Skagerrak and the Baltic Sea. It is not possible to assess the quota use for 
Kattegat based on these data.  
 
 
The cod recovery plans and the portfolio of technical measures 
For protection of the cod juvenile the minimum mesh size in cod ends in the Kattegat trawling was raised 
from 60 to 70 mm in 1989 and to 90 mm in 2005. The 2005 change was a part of the cod recovery plan of 
2004. This consisted of new regulations regarding limitation of TACs (and changes between years), 
limitation of fishing effort (reduced days-at-sea) and new control measures, among these requirement of 
notification of landing location and estimated volumes two hours before arrival to one of the accepted 
landing ports for cod (Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004).  
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The regulation of fishing effort took form as regulation of days-at-sea. The days at sea were fixed to a 
certain level depending on type of gear. For the EU trawlers in Kattegat using 90 mm trawl the yearly days-
at-sea was at 108 in 2005, later decreasing to 71 days. If the trawl was supplemented with a 120 mm 
square-mesh window in the top panel, the maximum days-at-sea was increased by 30 (and later 36) days a 
year. Use of a sorting grid gave free days-at-sea (Com(2005)27, com(2006)51 and com(2007) 41). The 120 
mm top panel was generally in use after few years, while the sorting grid has never been in use by Danish 
fishers (Madsen and Valentinsson 2010).  
The regulations following the cod recovery plan of 2004 did not lead to the intended reduction of fish 
mortality and rebuilding of the cod stocks. A new regulation (EC regulation (EC) No 1342/2008) thus 
replaced the 2004 regulation. This regulation further strengthened the fishing effort limitations and 
procedures for setting of TACs. If the stock is predicted to be below the minimum spawning biomass, the 
fishing mortality should be reduced by 25 % a year. In that case the TAC and the fishing effort should be 
reduced with the same percentage. However, the plan also opened for additional fishing effort for highly 
selective gear and cod-avoidance fishing trips. The member states could take new mechanisms in use, 
which in the Danish context lead to the introduction of a protection of the cod in the spawning period 
(February, March and April), where the numbers of days-at-sea counted 2,5 for each actual day.   
 
Danish - Swedish bilateral agreement on closed areas in Kattegat 2009 
As a supplement to the EU cod recovery plan the Danish and Swedish governments signed a bilateral 
agreement regarding closed areas for cod fishery in Kattegat and the northern part of Oresund. This plan 
was also in effect from January 1 2009 and will be evaluated after three year.  
Three types of closed areas were 
agreed on: 
Permanent closed area (marked with 
red): Identified as the most important 
spawning area for the cod. It is closed 
for all types of fishery all year. 
Closed area (green): Closed for all 
type of fishery (except caves for 
nephrops) in the period January to 
March. Open for fishery using special 
selective gear the rest of the year.   
Source: Ministry of food, Agriculture and Fishery 2008. 
Seasonal closed area (brown line): Closed for fishery with non-selective gear from January to March and 
open rest of the year.  
From 2009 new types of selective trawl have been developed and tested. For 2012 six types of trawl is 
allowed (depending of area and time of the year). All are using 90 mm diamond mesh in the cod-end. Trawl 
based on 2 or 4 panels with a 180 mm square mesh escape window or a 4 panel trawl with a 270 mm 
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diamond mesh escape window (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery 2011b). The special selective gear 
to use in certain periods in the brown and green closed area is trawl with sorting grid, the SELTRA 300 and 
the topless trawl. This leads to six different types of trawl to be used in Kattegat depending of zone and 
time of year (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery 2010b).  
The development and test of the selective trawl took place in a working group formed after the agreement 
was signed. Fishers from Gilleleje proposed adjusting and using a few older types of trawl; a plaice trawl 
used in the Baltic earlier and a so-called “German trawl” originally used for saithe in the North Sea. But two 
other new types of trawl were developed; the topless trawl and the SELTRA 300 together with the so-called 
Swedish grid. These will be described below based on Madsen and Valentinsson 2010.  
The sorting grid is placed before the cod-end with the grid in a position which allows the nephrops to bars 
with 35 mm distance and lead fish of larger size to escape from a window above the grid. This is not used 
by Danish fishers, as they claim there is a high risk of blocking the grid with mud in the shallow waters of 
Kattegat as well as a high risk of being hurt in handling the grid, especially at the side trawlers (fisher 
interviews).  
Figure 3: The Standard sorting grid in nephrops trawl.  
 
Source: Madsen and Valentinsson 2010 
The topless trawl is a traditional trawl, where a part of the top panel is reduced (see the illustration below). 
This allows the trawl to catch nephrops and some flatfish, while other fish escape by going up in the water. 
According to the fisher interviews this is not used yet. The argument is that the traditional trawl only 
operates with a 50 cm opening from the bottom, which already allows the fish to escape.  
Figure 4: Topless trawl: conventional trawl compared to topless trawl.  
 
 
Source: Madsen and Valentinsson 2010 
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Apparently, the mostly used selective trawl is the SELTRA 300 trawl. A six meter long four panel section is 
put in the trawl before the cod-end. The top panel includes a three meter long escape window with 300 
mm square mesh. There is a controversy over the interpretation of the mesh size. Of unclear reasons the 
present interpretation in the regulation is 300 mm on each side, whereas the fishers interpret this as 300 
mm in the diagonal open or closed (in this case the diagonal is 420 mm or 600 mm respective) (fisher 
interview). 
 Figure 5: SELTRA trawl with sorting box.  
 
Source: Madsen and Valentinsson 2010 
 
Fishers initiated failed attempts to establish alternative regulation  
Traditionally the fishers in the area have been active in regard toothier working conditions. They have been 
strongly represented in the fishermen’s association. The chairman of the Danish Fishermen’s Association 
(DFA) through many years; Bent Rulle is still an active fisher on Læsø, where he is chairman of the local 
fishermen’s association. The present chairman of DFA is the former chairman of Strandby Fishermen´s 
Association, and one of the driving forces in the trial of the effort management scheme in Kattegat 
mentioned below.   
The fishers of Kattegat have also been involved in attempts to develop alternative management systems. In 
the last six years at least two fishers have initiated attempts to establish alternative management schemes, 
but have failed.  
Effort management scheme in Kattegat 
The most important attempt was the attempt to establish a trial of effort management scheme in Kattegat. 
This was a reaction on the cod recovery plan of 2004/2005 and the reduction of fishing opportunities. 
Danish and Swedish fishers around Kattegat proposed to establish a pure effort management of the 
Kattegat fishery as a trial. The work with the effort management scheme for Kattegat was done within the 
framework of the North Sea RAC, in the working group for Skagerrak/Kattegat. The work started in 2005; a 
first proposal was launched in June 2005 and a revised proposal a year later (NSRAC 2006). The proposal 
was discussed among the fishers of Kattegat and through the NSRAC with the Commission. In June 2007 a 
meeting between the working group members and the Commission’s Head of Unit Fish A (fisheries 
conservation) Mr Ernesto Penas Lado took place. Two main problems were left: 1) the actual numbers of 
days-at-sea (kW-days) in the scheme. The fishers required to know the consequences of the trial before 
accepting to participate and 2) the management of the days-at-sea in regard to the first three month of the 
year, where the unwanted catch of juvenile cod is registered as much higher than the rest of the year 
(NSRAC, WG Skagerrak and Kattegat, June 2007). As these questions could not be answered clearly by the 
Commission the NS RAC drew back the proposal a few months later. This was apparently a reaction which 
surprised the Commission (Borg 2007), which seemed to be interested in the trial.  
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Another factor which probably also played a role in the withdrawal of the proposal from the NSRAC was the 
development of the FKA system mentioned above. The relation between the transferable quotas and the 
effort scheme was never clear, and some fishers had the fear that they would lose rights to quotas if they 
participated in the effort trial. 
Selective behaviour – local attempt to verify low catch (and discard) of cod in the nephrops fishery.  
The local fisher owned processing industry Læsø Fiskeindustri (fish processing industry) attempted to 
develop documentation for selective fishery for the nephrops fishers.  Læsø Fiskeindustri, one of the largest 
employers on the island of Læsø, processes nephrops mainly from Kattegat. With the 2008 cod recovery 
plan and counting 2.5 days-at-sea per actual fishing day in February, March and April, the industry could 
foresee serious lack of raw material three months a year. Therefore they wanted to put up a project which 
should document/make it probable that the fishers did not discard cod, and therefore could get additional 
days-at-sea. The project idea generated by fishers around Læsø Fiskeindustri consisted of documentation of 
very low discards based on combining existing registrations and new measures: 
• Documentation of catches and landings (showing the cod quota is not fully used)  
• Using data from an existing observation programme; data from the fisheries control, data from the 
discard programme and oversampling in relation to establishing a reference fleet (which includes 
on board observers)   
• Documentation of catch area (VMS data) 
• Real-time closures of areas with many cod (juvenile as well as over MLS) based on fishers’ reports. 
• A code of conduct between the participating vessels, with the Læsø Fiskeindustri as responsible for 
maintaining the code of conduct 
The initiative was supported by local politicians, but not actively by the Fishermen’s Association and not at 
all by the Ministry. Internally in the fishermen’s association it could probably be a problem that the 
initiative only covered part of the Kattegat Nephrops fishers. More important that at the same time the 
ministry worked on the Danish - Swedish bilateral agreement described above, which overruled the local 
initiative.  
Danish Cod Avoidance Plan for the Kattegat 
As the cod spawning biomass remains under the minimum level, the direct consequences of the 2008 cod 
avoidance plan is a 25 % reduction of the quota and fishing effort (days-at-sea) each year, meaning that the 
available fishing days would be reduced by 76 % from 2008 to 2013. This would close the Kattegat fishery 
as such. In order to maintain especially the nephrops and flatfish fishery in the Kattegat, the Danish 
Ministry therefore developed the Danish Cod Avoidance Plan for the Kattegat after consultation with the 
Danish Fishermen´s Association. The plan summarises initiatives taken from 2008 (described above):  
• Closed areas in the Kattegat 
• Closed area in the Sound 
• Use of trawl with a square meshed panel in the Kattegat 
• Introduction of the use of fishing pools in reducing discards 
• Obligatory use of selective fishing gear in the Kattegat 
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The plan documents how these selective measures deliver a reduction in fishing mortality for cod in 
accordance with the long-term plan for cod stock (Høegh 2010, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery 
2010). The effort in Kattegat (days-at-sea) therefore will be relative stable to 2013 despite of a continued 
low level of the cod biomass. 
 
 
Fisher consideration regarding control and legitimacy 
 
Control  
The control consists of occasional control at sea, where the vessel is boarded by control officers, landing 
control, control based on log books, general administrative control and the registrations from auctions. The 
nephrops fishery in Kattegat is controlled in relation to the cod fishery. 4 % of all cod landings were 
controlled at land and 10 % of the volume (Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fishery 2011c). According to 
the nephrops fishers the control is only registered when they have cod in the catch. The frequency of 
control is therefore likely to be higher than 4 % of the landings for the nephrops fishers. In general the 
paper control from auctions and processing industries has increased the last year, which means that 
landing of larger volumes of unregistered catches for further processing is very difficult and rare. Catch 
composition control is under development in Denmark, but still only used in relation to cod fishery.   
The last year a remarkable case of illegal fishery in the closed area in Kattegat has been revealed. Activists 
from Greenpeace had illegally placed a hidden GPS at several vessels from the harbour of Gilleleje. The GPS 
tracking over more than six months showed several illegal entrances in the closed area north of Gilleleje for 
more than five vessels. The GPS tracking were delivered to the police and used in a trial where so far three 
fishers have been given fees and confiscation of value of landings. The case has been condemned by the 
Danish Fishermen’s Association. In this particular case one of the interviewed and convicted fishers regrets 
the illegal fishing; he explains that it developed little by little in the fishing community and was felt legalised 
especially by two factors: a) the area is only closed to Danish and Swedish fishers. The few German fishers 
with quotas in Kattegat can– and do – fish fully legally in the area and b) the closure is due to cod recovery, 
but except for first quarter of the year, there is almost no cod in the area which is the traditionally local and 
good fishing area for nephrops. The lack of cod was also shown in the landing registrations from the trips.  
It should be noted that the fishers wanted the Greenpeace activist convicted for illegal entrance at private 
area (the vessels). In February 2012 the activist was acquitted in the first instance of law. The illegal 
entrance to a private area was less important than the possibility to uncover the fishers’ illegal activities. 
This has been appealed to a higher instance. 
There are no data on violation of fisheries regulation specifically for the group. In relation to discards (or 
lack of discards) there are rumours of illegal landing of undersized nephrops for the local and tourist 
market. There are some examples of the fisheries control catching fishers in selling undersized nephrops 
from the vessel, but no evidence of organised marked for undersized nephrops.  
In general, the fishers claim to have good relations with the control officers, though there are stories of 
strict and rigid interpretation of e.g. the measuring of mesh sizes in relation to the at sea control. Even in 
relation to the incidence of illegal fisheries and the trial the fisheries control is not blamed for the process. 
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Legitimacy of the decision rules and measurements in general 
In general the fishers signal acceptance of a system of regulation and control; none of the interviewees 
talked about “the good old days” of no regulation. In discussion of specific themes the fishers mix and 
interpret their own daily experiences with biological arguments (discuss interaction between species, 
influence of other factors like water temperature, pollution and chemicals from land, refer to scientific 
descriptions of fish and fish behaviour etc.). Many of the interviewees have periodically or over longer 
periods participated in scientific tests of gear, monitoring of discards or specific stock abundance etc. They 
have experiences in interaction with biologists and other scientists.  
Despite of this, the fishers have a massive critique of specific quota assessments and technical measures. 
This again leads to stated unwillingness to continue the cooperation with biologists and “the system”.  
- Some fishers have participated in e.g. test fisheries for assessment of sole over several years. Still 
the quota was reduced by 25 % “due to lack of data”. 
- The registration of discard data lacks several years behind. It does not reflect the present situation 
as regulations, use of gear and stock composition has changed.  
- Based on scientific data especially the fishers from Gilleleje in the southern part of Kattegat argue 
that the place and time for closing fishing areas do not reflect the appearance of cod which it 
claims to protect. They feel they are victims in a political process as their arguments are not heard.  
- The regulations and technical measures for Kattegat have changed very rapidly in the last years. 
The fishers are disappointed over lack of time to implement a change, before new restrictive 
changed rules are introduced. Why not see if the new gear etc. functions? 
The conclusion on this differs between the ordinary fishers and the representatives closer to the Danish 
Fishermen´s Association. The general impression of the reaction from the fishermen is that they seem to 
think that they could have a kind of agreement with “the system” to have a pause for new rules to 
implement and evaluate the old ones.  But as this is not the case, they seem to have lost trust in the system 
and tend to conclude that the regulation initiatives are mainly politically generated rather than based on 
real problems (otherwise former initiatives would have been evaluated), and that new regulations are 
added to the old ones with new layers of regulations and control systems.  
Many of the fishers tend to react, as one fisher: “everything will be used against us, the fishers” -- therefore 
there is a high level of scepticism even toward reasonable new regulation elements. 
This approach is clearly reflected among the chairs of the local fishermen´s associations. Still they explain 
that the fishers have to take part in the institutions and cooperation that exist.  
 
 
Community 
The social structures which influence the discards pattern can be organised in communities at various 
levels. The most important community, which has been partly invisible during the interviews, is the identity 
of being a nephrops fisher. In all ports the fishers explained that ten years ago they were mainly fishing cod, 
with nephrops as a supplementary catch. Today cod is the not the target species, not even seen in all hauls. 
Most fishers do not catch their entire yearly quota and explain that the cod is so dispersed that they newer 
go on targeted cod fishery despite of quota left and good prices at the auction.    
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This is why the description is organised in themes with specific comments if other communities are more 
dominant in regard to specific identities, norms etc.  
 
 
Descriptions of the ports/regions as communities 
The interviewed fishers are fishing from three (four) ports as communities.  
 
Source: Ministry of food, Agriculture and Fishery 2008, own indication of ports. 
Læsø is a small island of 118 square kilometres placed in the northern part of Kattegat. It is the smallest 
municipality in Denmark. Today Læsø has 1,949 inhabitants, which is a decline from 3,500 in the 1950-ties. 
For a long time, fisheries have been the dominant profession, but tourism related and public occupations 
are more important today. Læsø has had a strong tradition of fisheries from the two distinct ports located 
in the two ends of the Island; Vesterø and Østerby, both with their own branch of the fishermen´s 
association. They merged only a few years ago. The last years there have been a steep decrease in number 
of vessels and active fishers. Today there are approx. 25 active fishing vessels on Læsø with an expectation 
of a further decrease in the coming years partly due to very low recruitment of young fishers. This has 
created a negative view on the future among the fishers. The fishery is highly focused on nephrops 
delivered to the local fisher-owned Læsø Fiskeindustri. This processing industry has grown relative strong 
with a processing plant also in Frederikshavn (Jutland) and in Scotland.  
Strandby is a local community of 2,400 inhabitants. Strandby is part of the Frederikshavn municipality in the 
eastern part of Northern Jutland. There are 20 active vessels in the port – previously up to 90 local vessels. 
The port offers most necessary services as auction, trawl maker, ice, electricians etc. There is also a minor 
number of fish processing industries in the port.   
Strandby 
Vesterø 
Østerby 
Gilleleje 
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Gilleleje is a local community of 6,500 inhabitants. Gilleleje is a part of the Helsinge municipality in the 
northern part of Zealand. The town of Gilleleje has grown around the port. Gilleleje has faced a decrease in 
the number of vessels. Today there are approx. 15 active vessels left in the port, with an expectation of a 
further reduction in the coming years. The port has most of the necessary facilities as auction, collection 
centrals and local craftsmen. 
 
 
Norms regarding discards 
The interviews with fishers have revealed differences in the understandings of discards and what the 
fishers see as the problem of discards.  
There are different opinions among the fishers about what discarded fraction should be discusses or not.  
Generally the fishers do not see discards of non-commercial species as a problem to be discussed, although 
they think and fear that the public and political definition will include these parts.  
Most of the interviewed fishers see a relevance of discussing discards for commercial species (over and 
under MLS), whereas a few claim that only the discards of commercial species over MLS (high grading) is to 
be discussed. 
These different views should be seen in the light of how the fisher understands the economic and 
ecological consequences of fisheries and discards.  
Thinking in ecological systems  
In general the interviewed fishers expressed an experience-based thinking and understanding of the 
complex interaction between species and other natural conditions for the fisheries. In a practical way they 
claimed that the discarded material is not lost, but recycled. Their experiences at the nephrops banks 
(where they mainly fish) are that all discarded invertebrates, fish and nephrops disappears very fast. The 
discards will not appear in the trawl all though they return in the same track shortly after. They conclude 
that most of the discarded nephrops survive and hide after being discarded and/or the remaining nephrops 
at the sea bottom eat the dead organic material. The interpretation differs between the ports; In one port 
the fishers believed in a high rate of survival of the discarded nephrops and some fish species, in others 
they were open to this opportunity as well as the opportunity of the discards to be maily dead and eaten by 
others. All reported that only crabs and conchs can be caught dead in following hauls. Many fishers referred 
to an experience of areas which were left for some time grow wild in plants and therefor turned to be bad 
fishing areas. A few combined these experiences in agricultural terms of maintain the good bottom for the 
nephrops by continual trawling and feeding the nephrops with discarded material.  
The fisheries regulation in Kattegat is mainly driven by the recovery plans of the cod stock. In this relation 
the fishers have several theories explaining why the cod remains at a very low level, though they catch very 
few cod (as indicated by landing statistics). Some of the interviewed points at external factors from land 
(pollution from land activities: agriculture or industry, heating of the sea from cooling etc.) or at large scale 
changes of sea temperature etc. as explanations. Stories are told regarding water turning brown of 
sediments in the melting water from the Swedish rivers in the late spring scaring the fish from the areas 12-
15 miles from the coast, or (for the gill-netters near the Swedish coast) acid turning the catch white after 
heavy rain. 
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Quite a few though claimed that an uneven fisheries pressure disturbs the balances. As an example the 
reduction of fisheries for industrial purposes after whiting, small dab and greater weever have led to a 
growing abundance of these species. The fishers think that they compete with the cod – either as 
competitors on the feed or they breed on cod larvae’s.  
Most of the interviewees therefore meant that closing the fishery for industrial purposes have changed the 
balances of the ecosystem and thereby have had consequences for other species and fisheries. Also in this 
light, the possible catch and discards of the species without commercial interest are not a problem –it 
rather helps maintaining a balance in the ecosystem.  
Economic approach to discards 
All fishers expressed that they need not to discard marketable fish due to lack of quotas. Within an 
economic approach discards of non-commercial species and some low paid species were regarded as an 
acceptable and good economy. It was regarded as a waste of energy and financial means to land non-
commercial species and organisms. Some fishers stressed the practical problems in handling the volumes of 
“useless” material. Other than the cost in money and work in some cases were too high compared to 
market prices.  
Political approach to discards 
In the biological and economic approach the fishers seem to regard discards only as a small problem. Seen 
from the fishers’ perspectives discards are rather a political problem.  
The fishers recognizes the cod is under pressure (it is obvious from their own experiences). The attitude is 
“they claim cod is under pressure and should be protected – so we better take care and avoid the cod” 
(fisher from Strandby). Most of the interviewees felt that the public in general and the political audience do 
not understand the situation in the fisheries, and that discards should be seen as a natural and unavoidable 
waste in fisheries, although it should be reduced if possible. In this regard several interviewees compared 
the discards “waste” in fisheries to agriculture, where low prices at the markets could lead to slaughtering 
of calves and milk poured down the drain. At the same time all interviewees understood that the public 
opinion “is not blowing in our direction (regarding discards and discards ban)”.  In political terms discards 
are a problem and they have to deal with reduction of discards, except from their practical views on 
discards.   
During the interviews there were no examples of active social enforcement of the norms regarding discard 
– neither in pro discard (laughing of or teasing someone landing many small fish) or contra discard 
(troubling someone with only large individual indicating a high level of high grading). Two interviewees 
though referred in a negative tone to larger vessels which went for at fishing ground in Skagerrak with high 
abundance of nephrops, but high level of undersized. Despite from this, the general acceptance of the view 
on discard (various aspects) could be seen as the general social norms on discards.  
 
 
The fishers’ active steps to reduce or avoid discards 
First of all the, over time fishers have changed the trawl according to the changing regulations, changes in 
mesh sizes, the cod-end, use of panels and windows etc. Some of these measures are more restrictive in 
the Kattegat area than in Skagerrak, but several fishers claimed that they also used the new more selective 
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gear in Skagerrak, mainly to avoid investments in different types of gear and repeatedly change of gear 
when they change fishing areas.  
Even within Kattegat the strict interpretation of the rules by the fisheries control forces the fishers to use 
mesh sizes a little larger than the minimal allowed. During use the mesh sizes tend to shrink. Therefore 95 
mm mesh size is preferable to 90 mm mesh size in the cod-end in the recent trawls.  
The fishers try to avoid the areas with a higher concentration of cod, even though they hold unused quota 
for cod. Different reasons are mentioned. At one hand a sense of responsibility for the stock and public 
pressure: “They say the cod is not in good shape – so we better avoid them”. At the other hand a more 
practical reason; despite a higher concentration of cod in these areas, the outcome from targeting 
nephrops in other areas is still higher. The cod is simply not as financially interesting a target as nephrops in 
other areas.  
Knowledge about fishing places etc. is exchanged between the fishers in different social groups. To some 
degree the information exchange is based on ports, but within and across the ports information is also 
exchanged in other networks. The overall picture from the interviews is that in general information is 
spread via the telephone in a one-to-one communication, but very quickly spread in the whole group due 
to intense communication by telephone and communication in the port. There seems to be openness 
about use of gear as well as problems and considerations about best use of the gear. Information about 
fishing grounds is also exchanged, though apparently more in closer relations, though also this type of 
information is generally widespread in a short amount of time. It was mentioned as an exception from the 
openness that a fisher could “work up” a fishing ground (by trawling the same areas several times in order 
to remove any stones). In this situation there is an acceptance of the fisher’s attempt to keep this place as 
his own secret. The culture of who to share information with seems to differ between the ports. All agreed 
that information would diffuse to all fishers in the port during short time. In some ports it was claimed that 
all interested were informed about good fishing grounds etc. as the open radio was used as media for 
information sharing. In other ports the information was shared only with some of the local fishers via 
mobile phones, while the rest of the fishers in the port would only learn about this later on when the 
information was spread in an indirect way (Cay gossip etc.).  
Finally the fishers presented various ideas of improvement of the trawl and other devices which could 
change the catch composition. But it was also concluded that in the present situation with detailed 
micromanagement most of these changes could not be tested without cooperation with research (here 
DTU Aqua). The test results from the research institutions are necessary for getting the changes accepted 
by management and control authorities.  
 
 
Identity: The fishers are marginalised in society and stigmatised as cheaters  
The fishers feel stigmatised as cheaters, as a fisher expressed it: ”Everybody thinks we are cheating”. In this 
light they are very reluctant to most new initiatives as they feel they will be used against them.  
In general the fishers feel they have “done what we were told to” over time, in regard to change of trawl 
types, closed areas, investments in quotas etc. They feel that the authorities just augment the claims and 
the stream of new regulations which is forced on them.   
Appendix 1: The Danish Case Study 
Appendices Page 19 
 
 
There seems to be an expectation of being able to make agreements with the management system. This 
means; if the fishers would accept a certain new restrictive regulation, they would be able to be free of 
further changes for a period of time. During the interviews the fishers express disappointment and feel the 
level of restrictions are changed all the time – whenever they try to adjust to one regulation (e.g. a new 
type of gear) other regulations are being added immediately.   
The disappointment regarding “agreements” with the management system and a feeling of being 
stigmatised as cheaters could result in a reaction of systematic non-compliance. Except for the fishing in 
closed areas (as descripted above) none such reactions were registered. On the contrary several fishers felt 
stressed of the feeling of never being able to fulfil all regulations. The dilemma of not wanting to be illegal 
and cheating and at the same time not being able to fulfil all requirements might be the reason why there 
are no examples of social control against non-compliance. During the interviews a few examples of 
enforcement of informal social control were given. But none was related to discards. Some of the 
interviewed can tell that they are told (at a rumour level) that somebody is cheating (fishing with to small 
mesh size, selling fish under MLS etc.). But in the stories these things has never been related to social 
control enforcement. It seems not to be approved, but it is accepted.  
The identity as fisher was not an explicit theme during the interview. Most of the interviewed had been 
fishers all their life and came from fishing families – with references to fathers, uncles etc. as fishers. But 
only one of the fishers had sons in the fishery. Some claimed they had warned their sons against starting 
fishing; one even claimed he had refused guaranteeing his son’s loan to buy a vessel. The conditions in the 
fisheries; changing regulations, uncertainty regarding the future conditions, the feeling of being illegal were 
used as arguments against a future in the fisheries for their sons – not the current financial situation and in 
general not the working conditions.  
 
 
Market 
The market is expected to be an important driver for discarding certain types of the catch for which there 
are no market at all or very low prices.  
 
 
Value of landings from Kattegat 
The statistics of all landings in Denmark from Kattegat (3AS) show registered landing of 51 species in a total 
value of 20 mill € in 2001. Of the 51 species only 8 has a total landing value over 100,000 €/year.  
Nephrops is by far the dominant commercial species, counting for 67 % of the landing values of consumer 
fish from Kattegat. Sole is the second most important. Cod only values 1 % of the total landing value as 
shown Table 6 below.  
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Table 6: Total landings in Danish ports from Kattegat 2010 - Danish and foreign vessels. Value, volume and 
price pr. kilo (source: www.fvm.dk). 
Species value (1000 €) 
% of total 
value volume (t) 
Price pr. 
kilo (€/kg) 
Nephrops € 13,549,7 66.9 1,774 € 7.64 
Sole € 3,203,9 15.8 301 € 10.64 
Herring € 1,280,6 6.3 3,349 € 0.38 
Lumpfish € 406,3 2.0 71 € 5.72 
Brill € 332,8 1.6 68 € 4.89 
Plaice  € 303,4 1.5 289 € 1.05 
Turbot € 224,0 1.1 33 € 6.79 
Cod € 208,7 1.0 113 € 1.85 
all other species € 732,0 3.6 712 € 1.03 
total landing € 20,241,2   6,710 € 3.02 
 
 
Market related discard from Kattegat  
Based on the WP 4 Working Paper and the result from the WP 3 analysis (ref.) one could expect market 
related discards of species with no market or with very low market price. There could be at least two 
reasons for discarding already caught marketable, but low priced fish. First the possibility of high grading, 
that the available quota should be used on larger and better prices individuals. Second that the fishers’ 
interpretation of cost of bringing the catch at the auction as higher than the possible income from sale.  
In the present situation in the Danish nephrops fishery, the high grading seems not to be relevant, as seen 
above in relation to quota related discards. But there are examples of discards of species and individuals 
with no or very low market value. 
Considerations regarding Minimum Landing Sizes 
Generally Minimum Landing Sizes, MLS is regarded as a conservation measure. But it is clearly connected to 
which sizes are marketable. The fishers are obviously annoyed with regulations which force the fishers to 
discard marketable fish – being 0-quota at a species or MLS over marketable size. In an interview an 
example of the latter was told; the rising of the MLS for a certain species resulted in discarding of fish 
previously over MLS and marketable, now under MLS. At the other hand there is a market for nephrops 
below the Danish MLS (as the MLS is lower in other regions). Still the fishers fear that a lower MLS probably 
would destroy the market also for the larger size nephrops (over the present MLS).  The fishers therefore 
assess the MLS against the market possibilities.  
Direct sales costs for low paid species  
The interviews revealed that some species which are paid with very low or varying (and therefore 
unpredictable) prices tend to get discarded of economic reasons. The flounder is an example of this. In 
periods they are purchased at very low prices at the auctions.  
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Table 7: Landing prices for flounder (not cleaned) at the auction in Strandby, January 10 to 17 2012. 
 Date Quality Average price 
(€) 
Volume (kg) 
Jan. 10 2 0.135 111 
 9 0.485 729 
Jan. 11 2 0.323 125 
 9 0.390 366 
Jan. 12 9 0.370 237 
Jan. 16 9 0.420 137 
Jan. 17 2 0.162 178 
 9 0.377 92 
Source: Fiskeauktion.dk 
The cost of landing fish is (based on prices in the port of Gilleleje)  
• Rent of the box (of 30 kg fish): € 0.88 (DKK 6.50) (to be paid when the box is landed) 
• Ice per box: € 0.88 (DKK 6.50) 
• Landing cost to the port: 3 % 
• Sales cost to the auction: 13% 
Based on the lowest price in the list above;  111 kg flounder quality 2 in four boxes on 10 January, the sales 
income is € 14.93, while the cost would be € 4.14, with € 10.79 (less than 0.10 €/kg) in income after sales 
costs1.  
 
 
Interpretation of cost in relation to discards 
Not only the market prices, but also the cost (direct or indirect) influences the fishers’ interpretation of net 
income from handling the specific catch. Various factors seem to influence this: 
- Expected price at the market and income from sale of each species 
- Direct costs related to landing as shown above.  
o The landing costs are partly related to the number of boxes. New regulations on traceability 
might lead to use of more boxes than previously. For catches less of 30 kg (a full box) regulation 
defines which species, sizes and qualities can be mixed in the same box. In some cases one 
individual of a given species and size will require a separate box. 
- Indirect costs 
o The practical difficulty of handling the box; many half empty boxes can be a problem to handle 
depending on the storage room and number of crew aboard.  
o Quite a few of the interviewed fishers were in their late 40-ties or 50-ties and regarded 
themselves as physically worn out. The extra effort and difficulty in lifting and handling boxes 
seem to be valuated as a higher priced “cost”, when assessing whether it is worth your while to 
keep or discard the fish. This factor also depends on the technology level on the vessel, to 
which degree the handling of boxes are manual or automatized. 
                                                          
1 Rent of four boxes: € 3.50, Ice: € 3.50. Cost to the port for landing: 3 % of € 14.93 = 0.45. Cost to the auction for sale: 
13 % of € 14.939 = 1,94. Total cost: € 4.14.   
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As the general paying method for crew members is catch value shares, the time spend for sorting the catch 
(and discards) do not influence the direct cost of handling and landing the box. But there is an indirect cost 
related to this; Time and effort used for sorting and eventually handling catches are considered as an 
indirect cost to be taken into consideration, especially for the elder or the worn out fishers. This 
interpretation of indirect costs of using time and effort on fish handling can lead to a higher or a lower 
discard behaviour.  
In some instances the effort of handling can be seen as too (indirect) costly for some low paid species. 
Given the (worst) example above the fisher may consider if it is worth the effort of handling, packaging and 
landing 110 kg flounder for 10 € ? – as expressed: “The income has to be decent. I am not doing this for 
fun”.  
While the indirect costs in handling the catch can lead to the discards of fish which could have given some 
income at the auction the valuation of sorting effort can also be an incentive for avoiding areas with a high 
level of unwanted catch to discard. A fisher, fishing alone, normally with relative short hauls mentioned 
that a huge sorting effort could delay the fishing. He had to finish sorting before the next haul was taken 
aboard. In certain situation this argues for to avoiding the areas with a potentially high level of unwanted 
catch and discards. He and other fishers therefore preferred, if possible, to fish in areas known for 
eventually fewer, but larger nephrops. Likewise areas with many small dabs or greater weevers were 
avoided to reduce the sorting work.  
 
 
Technological investments 
In general the vessels are relative old. In the last years the larger investments seem to have focused on 
buying up old vessels with quotas. In that case the best vessel (often the newest) is used for fishery, while 
the other is sold or scrapped. Two of the quota pools had collectively bought quotas (with vessels), and 
some fishers had bought vessels and quota at private basis. The scope of quota buy up in Kattegat is 
however not clear in this relation. Very few of the interviewed have invested in quotas as they are able to 
rent supplementary quotas if their individual quota composition does not fit the actual catches. Everybody 
had invested in new trawl in order to follow the changing rules regarding mesh size, panels and windows 
etc. In relation to discards the long-term investments in vessels is directed towards augmenting the 
available quota, while, to a large extent, the short-term investments (in gear) have been directed towards 
reduction of unwanted catch of cod, and thereby reduction of at least the demersal fish by catch and 
discards. 
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pools in Denmark. www.puljefiskeri.dk).   
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Appendix 
Source: Imares 2010, Table 1.  Summary of the mean numbers (Nb) and weights (Wt, in kg) of species 
discarded (top, D) and landed (bottom, L) per hour per trip for each métier (active gears). Species of 
commercial interest/target species are highlighted in grey. *indicates top ten ranking numbers.  Blank cells: 
species were either not caught and/or not recorded. NA = No data were available. 
  
Kattegat (IIIa, IIIn) 
OTB: bottom otter trawl, TBB: beam trawlers, SDN: anchored seines. DEF: demersal fish, CRU: crustanceans 
(from: COMMISSION DECISION of 6 November 2008 adopting a multiannual Community programme 
pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 199/2008 establishing a Community framework for the collection, 
management and use of data in the fisheries sector and support for scientific advice regarding the common 
fisheries policy (2008/949/EC) (948_2008.pdf). 
 
Species Metier OTB_CRU OTB_DEF TBB_DEF SDN_DEF 
 Country DNK DNK DNK DNK 
 ICES sub-area IIIan IIIan IIIan IIIan 
 Average trip 
duration 
2.78 3.55 7.54 2.35 
 Metier Mean Mean Mean Mean 
Eutrigla gurnardus – 
gray gurnard 
D (Nb) 7.4 9.9 3.9 4.5 
D (Wt) 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.7 
L (Nb) 0.8 1.2  1.6 
L (Wt) 0.1 0.2  0.3 
Gadus morhua – cod D (Nb) 29.5 36.8 7.9 48.5 
 D (Wt) 8.8 16.2 2.5 19.8 
 L (Nb) 4.2 16.5 2.7 25.9 
 L (Wt) 8.0 30.8 10.5 36.3 
Glyptocephalus cynoglossus –torbay 
sole 
D (Nb) 19.9 20.8 0.6 2.0 
D (Wt) 1.4 2.3 0.2 0.2 
L (Nb) 12.6 25.4 0.4 40.1 
 L (Wt) 3.9 7.5 0.9 12.0 
Hippoglossoides platessoides – 
American plaice 
 
D (Nb) 97.4 19.8 0.8 14.3 
D (Wt) 4.7 1.4 0.0 2.1 
L (Nb) 0.1    
L (Wt) 0.0    
Limanda limanda – dab D (Nb) 54.9 61.2 88.8 67.8 
 D (Wt) 3.4 6.9 6.5 9.1 
 L (Nb) 1.4 18.0 45.1 36.5 
 L (Wt) 0.4 4.7 9.3 8.1 
Lophius piscatorius –monkfish D (Nb) 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 
 D (Wt) 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 L (Nb) 0.6 1.7 0.5 0.5 
 L (Wt) 2.3 5.9 2.9 1.4 
Melanogrammus aeglefinus –haddock D (Nb) 27.2 30.0 1.1 15.2 
 D (Wt) 5.1 6.0 0.1 3.6 
 L (Nb) 7.0 42.8 0.6 42.8 
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 L (Wt) 4.8 27.5 1.0 35.7 
Merlangius merlangus – whiting D (Nb) 30.7 9.4 0.6 4.8 
 D (Wt) 4.0 1.5 0.0 0.4 
 L (Nb) 2.6 2.1  0.8 
 L (Wt) 0.8 1.0  0.3 
Merluccius merluccius – hake D (Nb) 6.6 5.7  4.3 
 D (Wt) 1.9 1.6  1.5 
 L (Nb) 2.4 2.0 0.4 2.5 
 L (Wt) 2.4 2.4 0.9 2.7 
Microstomus kitt – lemon sole D (Nb) 5.7 8.1 0.7 3.1 
 D (Wt) 0.7 1.1 0.1 0.4 
 L (Nb) 1.5 10.0 4.5 11.1 
 L (Wt) 0.4 3.6 2.5 3.0 
Nephrops norvegicus – nephrops D (Nb) 873.0 106.3  0.4 
D (Wt) 20.9 2.7  0.0 
L (Nb) 288.7 53.6  0.3 
L (Wt) 16.4 4.9  0.0 
Platichthys flesus – flounder D (Nb) 1.7 2.2 0.8 11.7 
 D (Wt) 0.2 0.8 0.3 4.8 
 L (Nb) 0.1 1.5  7.3 
 L (Wt) 0.0 1.0  2.3 
Pleuronectes platessa –  plaice D (Nb) 21.6 77.8 190.5 314.2 
D (Wt) 3.1 11.7 26.7 46.3 
L (Nb) 7.1 58.6 485.0 262.2 
L (Wt) 2.5 17.7 161.6 73.6 
Pollachius pollachius –  pollock D (Nb)  0.4   
 D (Wt)  0.4   
 L (Nb) 0.6 0.7  0.9 
 L (Wt) 1.2 1.9 4.0 2.0 
Pollachius virens –– coalfish D (Nb) 9.7 11.4 0.3 3.4 
 D (Wt) 7.7 7.1 0.1 2.7 
 L (Nb) 21.9 34.7 0.4 9.8 
 L (Wt) 28.2 56.0 1.1 25.5 
Psetta maxima – turbot -  D (Nb) 0.3 1.7 0.5 1.5 
 D (Wt) 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 
 L (Nb) 0.2 1.6 3.3 0.5 
 L (Wt) 0.4 2.1 5.0 1.0 
Solea solea –   sole  D (Nb) 2.7 1.5 0.7  
 D (Wt) 0.3 0.1 0.0  
 L (Nb) 0.9 6.7 5.9 0.8 
 L (Wt) 0.3 2.3 2.4 0.3 
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Case: The Greek Otter Trawl Fishery 
 
 
Introduction and summary 
 The case description is structured around the list of factors, which might function as drivers for the 
discards and selective behaviours. As with the Kattegat Case Study (CS) these are somewhat “artificially” 
split in natural conditions/state/market and community drivers for high discarding and low discarding 
behaviour but discussed in more than one place. Table 2 summarizes findings and factors relevant to the 
Greek CS. 
The data for the Greek case study originate from desk research, to some degree conclusion from previous 
work packages of the Badminton project and 16 personal interviews with fishers from 8 ports, 3 ports in the 
Ionian Sea (7 interviews) and 5 ports in the Aegean Sea (9 interviews) (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: The ports where interviews were conducted. 
The interviewees are based on major ports for trawl vessels in the Ionian and Aegean Seas. They are either 
skippers or owners of trawl vessels who however take part in fishing activities and have a very good idea of 
practices related to mixed demersal trawl fisheries exerted in the area. Several of the fishers participate 
occasionally in research related fishery (test of trawl, selectivity experiments). Most interviews took place 
in facilities in the port. The interviews had duration of 1-2 hours. In most cases (depending of agreement 
with the interview person) the summary of the interview was sent for comment/approval to the 
interviewee.  
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Summary:  the most important factors  
In the scheme below is summarised the findings from the case study, distributed on the natural conditions 
and the three  types of institutions (state, community, market) and how the factors contributes as a driver 
for a behaviour of high discard level or driver for selective or low-discard behaviour. 
Table 1: Summary of factors driving toward a higher or lower discard level 
 Drivers for high discarding behaviour Drivers for selective/low(er) discarding 
behaviour 
Natural 
conditions 
*Mixed demersal fishery – unavoidable 
bycatch 
 
 
 
* Nursery grounds-high bycatch/discards 
of young fish 
 
Using selective gear: fishers are interested if it 
would reduce sorting times (and cost) by 
providing “cleaner” catches and retain /or 
increase profits. However, they feel that most 
escapees are damaged and die anyways. 
Adopting spatio-temporal closures: provided 
there is strong scientific evidence, regular 
review of the situation, and effort 
displacement in other areas 
State *MLS regulation and landing ban of 
undersized fish 
*Landing and administrative control  
 
* Relatively low compliance results in low 
discarding.  
*Compulsory use of selective gear, but 
enforcement is rather weak. 
 
Market *Low prices on certain species (high 
grading) 
 
 
* Lately the financial crisis resulted in less 
high grading and even low demand species 
are now more attractive to consumers. 
* Local “black” markets for undersized fish (as 
seen in fish taverns and documented in 
questionnaires) 
 
Community *View on discard - some of it is OK in the 
Mediterranean oligotrophic ecosystem 
since they’re feeding benthos, fish and 
seabirds. They do not perceive it as an 
important problem. 
 
 
 
 
Natural conditions for the Greek Otter trawl fishery:  
The Aegean Sea covers about 214,000 square kilometres in area. The sea's maximum depth is 3,543 metres, 
east of Crete. The Ionian Sea is much deeper than the Aegean with narrow continental shelf. The Calypso 
Deep, the deepest point in the Mediterranean at −5,267 m is located in the Ionian Sea, south-west of Pylos, 
Peloponnese (Figure 2).   
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Figure 2: Greek case study 
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Trawl fishery is Greece, as well as most small scale fisheries in Mediterranean, could be characterised as a 
multispecies fishery. The most common targeted species consist of Mullus barbatus, Merluccius merluccius, 
Parapenaeus longirostris. A large proportion of the catch also includes Mullus surmuletus, Loligo vulgaris, 
Illex coindetii  Diplopus annularis, and Trachurus trachurus.   
 
 
The registered discard situation 
Figures 3 and 4 show the discards composition in Ionian and Aegean Sea, respectively, based on data 
collected in 2003-2006, 2008.  
 
 Figure 3: Discarded otter trawl species composition in the Ionia Sea 
 
 Figure 4: Discarded otter trawl species composition in the Aegean Sea 
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For the identification of the reasons for discarding discards data were analysed and allocated in four 
categories based on the length of individuals discarded. The categories as well as the inferred reasons for 
discarding are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Categories of discards and the associated reason for discarding (Catchpole 2012) 
Category Characteristics Inferred reason for discarding 
1 
Discarded fish below the legal minimum 
landing size (MLS) 
Mismatch between selectivity of the 
fishing gear and the legal MLS 
(however, due to low 
enforcement/compliance certain 
undersized fish that have a market 
price are sold). 
2 
Species with no commercial value/never 
landed (includes protected species); fish 
with no associated legal MLS  
Mismatch between the selectivity of 
the fishing gear and the opportunity to 
sell the fish (no market) 
3 
Fish with low demand and without a MLS  Inconsistency in marketing 
opportunities; inconsistencies in 
sorting the catch; damage to fish  
4 
Fish with low demand and with a legal MLS 
discarded at or above the legal MLS 
Inconsistency in the marketing 
opportunities; inconsistencies in 
sorting the catch; damage to fish 
 
Figures 5 and 6 summarise the reason for discarding for the Ionian and Aegean Sea, respectively. In the 
Ionian Sea the largest proportion of discards are either over MLS or below the minimum retention length. 
As a result, the most common inferred reasons for discarding are the mismatch between the selectivity of 
the fishing gear and the opportunity to sell the fish and the inconsistency in marketing opportunities or 
damaged fish. Parapenaeus longirostris, Sardina pilchardus, Trachurus trachurus, Boops boops and 
Engraulis encrasicolus constitute the largest proportion of the species that are over MLS. Sardine and 
anchovy are prohibited to be landed by trawlers. Spicara smaris, Citharus linguatula and Spicara flexuosa 
are mostly contributed to the species that are above the minimum length landed. Since there is no quota 
regulation in Greece this part of discards is inferred to inconsistency in the marketing opportunities. The 
discarded species that correspond to mismatch between the selectivity of the fishing gears and the legal 
MLS are mostly participated by Merluccius merluccius, Trachurus trachurus and Parapenaeus longirostris. 
Finally, fishes that are totally discarded are non-commercial species such as Lepidotrigla cavillone,  
Argentina sphyraena, Arnoglossus laterna and Lepidopus caudatus.      
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Figure 5: Discards allocation to reasons for discarding based on MLS or on minimum retention length in the 
Ionian Sea (GSA 3720 OTB_GRC - combined OTB métiers)  
 
Figure 6: Discards allocation to reasons for discarding based on MLS or on minimum retention length in the 
Aegean Sea (GSA 3722 Aegean Sea OTB_GRC - combined OTB métiers)  
In the Aegean Sea almost 70 % of discards in number of individuals is allocated in the under MLS and the 
under minimum retention categories. So, the most common inferred reasons for discarding are the 
mismatch between the selectivity of the fishing gear and the legal MLS or the opportunity to sell the fish. 
The discards under minimum retention length are mostly participated by non-commercial species such as 
Gadiculus argenteus, Macroramphosus scolopax and Argentina sphyraena. On the other hand the under 
MLS category consists of species such as Parapenaeus longirostris, Merluccius merluccius and Trachurus 
trachurus due to the mismatch between selectivity of the fishing gear and the legal MLS. More than 80 % of 
the discards belonging to the over MLS category constitute of Parapenaeus longirostris, Trachurus 
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trachurus, Sardina pilchardus and Engraulis encrasicolus. Amongst them sardine and anchovy are 
prohibited to be landed by trawlers, while the other two species are discarded due to the inconsistency in 
marketing opportunities or as damaged. Finally, species such as Illex coindetii, Citharus linguatula and 
Spicara smaris are discarded above the minimum landed length due to inconsistency to marketing 
opportunities.   
 
 
The fleet 
Trawl fishery in Greece numbered 323 vessels in 2008, with a total Gross Tonnage of 30.793, which 
corresponded to the 34.97 % of the total GT of Greek fishing fleet and total horse power up to 91880 KW. 
The proportion of trawl vessels in the total fishing fleet was 1.8 %, however trawl fishery contributed to the 
20 % of the total landings. The average crew per vessel was 6.5 and 7.13 for vessels 12-24 m and >24 m 
respectively in the Aegean Sea and 5.06 for the Ionian Sea (NSSG, 2008).  
The highest annual gross income per species per vessel for 2008 was attributed to Merluccius merluccius 
for both Aegean and Ionian Sea. In the Aegean Sea the annual income for the hake per vessel for vessels 
12-24 m were 61151€ and 108406€ for vessels >24 m. In the Ionian Sea these values were 87717€ and 
139462€, respectively. Mullus barbatus has also possessed a large proportion of the annual gross income in 
both seas. Cephalopods and mostly Loligo vulgaris had a large contribution to the total annual gross income 
in the Ionian Sea.   
The annual crew cost per vessel for trawls 12-24 m in the Aegean Sea was 53166€ and for vessels >24 m 
72295€. In the Ionian Sea the annual trawl crew cost was 59588€ per vessel. Crew members are paid by 
salaries with the exception of the Michaniona 
port where they paid by shares of the landings. 
 
Figure 7: Greek trawlers operating in North Aegean Sea.  Source http://notios-
evoikos.blogspot.com/2011/09/blog-post_4182.html 
 
Appendix 2: The Greek Case Study 
Appendices Page 9 
 
 
State: The regulation of the Greek trawl fishery   
The EC Regulation 1967/2006 bans bottom-trawl activities within 1.5 NM off the coast and imposes a 
modification of the cod-end mesh opening to 40 mm square mesh instead of diamond mesh or to 50 mm 
diamond mesh. The Greek legislation has adapted the EU regulation regarding the mesh size. As concerns 
the distance of trawling operations from the coast, the national regulation bans bottom-trawl activities in 
depths less than 50 m or 3 NM, where the 50 m isobath is extended further than 3 NM. Additionally, there 
is a four month closure (May-September) of trawl fishery in the Greek Seas and several local 
spatiotemporal closures (e.g. Figure 7). Trawl fishery is totally restricted in certain areas e.g. Porto Lagos 
Gulf, Amvrakikos and Itea Gulf and others.  MLS is also applied for most of the commercial species (Table 
3) and fishers obliged to discard fish under MLS. The compliance of Greek fishermen to the national and EU 
regulations is generally loose, especially regarding the MLS, resulting by the weakness of the authorities to 
monitor the numerous fishing vessels in remote fishing grounds and to impose the regulations. 
Table 3: Fish MLS according to the Hellenic legislation and the EC Regulation 1967/2006   
Scientific name    Common name    Minimum size Hellenic Legislation    Min size 1967/2006   
 1. Fish   
   
 Anguila anguila    Eel    30 cm     
 Boops boops    Bogue    10 cm     
 Dicentrarchus labrax    sea bass    23 cm    25 cm   
 Diplodus annularis    Annular sea bream    15 cm    12 cm   
 Diplodus puntazzo    sharpsnout sea bream      18 cm   
 Diplodus sargus    White sea bream    15 cm    23 cm   
 Diplodus vulgaris    Two-banded sea bream      18 cm   
 Engraulis engrasicolus    European anchovy    9 cm    9 cm   
 Epinephelus spp.    Groupers      45 cm   
 Epinephelus guaza    Grouper    45 cm     
 Lophius spp.    Anglerfish    30 cm     
 Lithognathus mormyrus    striped sea bream      20 cm   
 Lichia amia    Leer fish    14 cm     
 Merluccius merluccius    Hake    20 cm    20 cm  
 Mugil cephalus    Common grey mullet    16 cm     
 Mullus barbatus    striped mullet    11 cm    11 cm   
 Mullus surmuletus    Red mullet    11 cm    11 cm   
 Pagellus acarne    spanish sea bream      17 cm   
 Pagellus bogaraveo    Red sea bream      33 cm   
 Pagellus erythrinus    Common pandora    12 cm    15 cm   
 Pagrus pagrus    Common sea bream    18 cm    18 cm   
 Polyprion americanus    Wrekfish    45 cm    45 cm   
 Sardina pilchardus    European sardine      11 cm   
 Sardinella aurita    Gilt Sardine    10 cm     
 Scomber japonicus    Chub mackerel    12 cm    18 cm   
 Scomber spp.    Mackerel    18 cm    18 cm   
 Solea vulgaris    Common sole    20 cm    20 cm   
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 Sparus aurata    Gilt-head sea bream    20 cm    20 cm   
 Thunnus thynnus    Tune fish    70 cm - 6.4kg     
 Trachurus spp.    Horse mackerel, scad    12 cm    15 cm   
 Xiphias gladius    Swordfish    120 cm     
 
 
Figure 8: An example of spatiotemporal closures for trawlers in Korinthiakos Gulf, Patraikos Gulf and a part 
of the Ionian Sea.  
 
 
Fisher consideration regarding control and legitimacy 
 
Control  
The control consists of occasional control at sea, where the vessel is boarded by control officers, landing 
control, control based on log books, general administrative control and the registrations from auctions. 
There is no published historical or recent information on frequency of controls, changes in types of controls 
and publicly accessible information on trends or changes in types of violations or even administrative and 
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financial penalties imposed (i.e. fines and loss of fishing days). Control in the harbour or at sea is aimed at 
checking use of correct mesh size, although an unknown number of relevant authorities do not even 
possess proper mesh gauges (no data on how widespread is this lack or how strict is the control of the 
mesh size). Control in the harbour and at sea is also aimed at checking catch and deviations from MLS, 
again this is thought to being rarely enforced, although there are no data to show how/which auction sites 
have/had stricter controls.  There are no official data on frequency or quantities of undersized discards or 
landings, and indeed very rarely the media will report on these except when NGO’s will make the case of 
showing landings under MLS. Log books are minimalistic compared with logbooks kept in Northern 
European countries. Checks also include issue of proper tax receipts and waybills (recently also as part of 
fight against tax evasion).  
The main controls are the automated controls via the ‘blue box” the VMS system, what the fishermen call 
the “lazy from your office and fuel saving controls” on the spatio-temporal closures. These include a) fishing 
in the wrong/closed season, which are both enforced by port authorities and respected/non-violated by the 
fishermen, b) fishing in trawling season in closed bays (no data on frequency of violations) and c) fishing in 
forbidden zones arising from the EU Regulation 1967/2006 i.e. on Posidonia beds maerl or in less than 1.5 
mile distance from the shore independently of depth in addition to less than 1 nm or shallower than 50 m 
depth whichever comes first (as per national law). The loss of the fishing ground between 1.0 mile and 1.5 
miles is what the fishermen consider their biggest loss in recent decades. 
In general the fishers claim to have good relations with the control officers, this is thought to be because of 
traditional attitude of officers to be turn a blind eye/keeping peace/being part of the local 
community/receiving gifts/be lenient/be compromised in their ability to tell the difference in matters of 
size (mesh and fish) while enforcement of “automatic” violations for which the officer cannot be blamed 
keeps contact impersonal.   
Legitimacy of the decision rules and measures in general:  
As with the Baltic Sea CS, the fishers expect and accept a system of regulation and control; none of the 
interviewees talked about “the good old days” of no regulation. In discussion of specific themes the fishers 
mix and interpret their own daily experiences with biological arguments (discuss interaction between 
species, influence of other factors as water temperature, spread of alien macrophytes or alien toxic fish, 
plastics in the sea and pollution from land, refer to scientific descriptions of fish and fish behaviour etc.), 
compare control measures between them and other bigger more powerful sectors and their ability to 
impact the sea (agriculture for example is an important sector who gets away with murder re: for example 
pollutes with no penalties ). Frequent comparisons are also made with the numerous coastal fisheries, 
which except MLS regulations have minimal controls and these include lack of closed seasons and areas for 
a large number of them, lack of financial and administrative controls i.e. tax papers and waybills, and no 
obligation for VMS. 
A number of the interviewees have participated in scientific fisheries research or gear trials and have 
experiences in interaction with biologists and other scientists. A number of them would be willing to 
participate again (and be paid for it) to find out about areas with big clean catches with less discards. A few 
of them they would be willing to participate again (and be offered small compensation for it) to find out 
about true margins/areas of Posidonia, so to update the maps and avoid the fines and penalties.  In most 
cases they feel their expert knowledge of the marine system is ignored and their participation to research 
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surveys is not thought to be linked to any measures being implemented or any advice being taken up or 
less ignored. They feel more strongly about lack of scientific and fishers’ knowledge in decision making and 
implementations of spatial measures. 1) They feel that most closed bays are closed for decades and 
forgotten closed with no re-assessment and without scientific proof of gains so far or future advantages. 
Closed bays are closed to extractive uses like trawling but not coastal (un-regulated and un-monitored) 
fishing and not polluting or impacting uses, and some feel there should be a closed season for all the 
fisheries in Greece with most proposing May as the best candidate month. 2) There is perhaps one of the 
very few examples of industry requested research funded studies (through the “Fisheries Operational 
Programme EPAL”) and this is about proving loss of income and loss of vital fishing grounds with the 
implementation of the Mediterranean Regulation 1967/2006 and the ban of trawling in less than 1.5 mile 
distance from the shore (vs. the previous 1.0 mile). In this case they themselves think that their reaction 
was too late too weak not well thought out or coordinated and reactive enough and are not surprised to 
have being ignored and faced to their biggest loss of recent times. 
In contrary to the BS situation, the Greek fishers in general are used to deal with simpler management 
measures based on effort control and spatio-temporal closures, they see no escape from that and are 
willing to continue on this path if needs be by “exchanging” more closed times and areas with effort 
displacement or more days-at-sea or some other form of compensation. The large majority of the 
interviewed fishers (14 out of the 16 plus 3 out of 3 of the pilot questionnaires) are in favour of closed 
areas in the event of too many juveniles, but most of them request that closures are supported by scientific 
evidence and that closures are truly spatio-temporal on areas and times of high juveniles’ concentrations. 
Two fishers against this measure and two of those in favour have cited examples of permanently closed 
bays showing signs of degradation and reduced productivity. While still positive (11 out of the 16 plus 3 out 
of 3 of the pilot questionnaires) and in principle they state they are in favour of more MPAs or effort 
reductions … these too have to be supported by sound evidence and any-(proven)-good-for-the-
environment benefits traded in with other benefits including opening new areas to fishing or allowing 
fishing all year round in some areas or just plain subsidies. Some of them are in favour of closing May 
(reproductive period for many fish species) to all fishing in Greece “to save fishing” while some will want 
September open as “compensation”. Five fishers were against the measure saying, “we have enough 
prohibitions already” and/or “what is the purpose, good out of MPAs anyway”.  
Essentially however all of them are against permanent closures and areas forgotten closed for many 
decades with no official redress, assessment of their status and in reality with nothing good to show for. 
Examples include closed bays with environmental problems, no gains (increased production) for coastal 
fisheries or bays so littered with plastics (from greenhouses) that they are no good even for illegal fishing. 
 
 
Community 
The identity of the Greek trawler is that of a maritime businessman, their office is the sea but often also 
their fish selling shops or their taverns. Coastal fishermen too have often second jobs and other market 
connections but these two are a class apart:  re scale of operations in strategic investments and position in 
society (working class vs. middle class).   
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Descriptions of the ports/regions as communities 
The interviewed fishers are fishing from 8 ports, 3 ports (Kyllini, Patra, Zakynthos) in the Ionian Sea (7 
interviews) and 5 ports (Michaniona, Chalkis, Heraklion, Agios Nikolaos, Koilada Argolidas) in the Aegean 
Sea (9 interviews) (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Norms regarding discards 
Most of the fishers see discards as unavoidable part of their everyday practice and as a result of mixed 
fisheries. Discards to them are non-commercial species (waste of fuel money and space in the codend and 
potential cause of harm to good catch) and juvenile fish. They all seem to agree that discards have been 
reduced considerably now that the new 40 square mesh trawl gear is implemented and by that they explain 
that a lot of young fish escape thought the non-closing square mesh, juvenile that they would be otherwise 
discarded. It seems that they are content with this arrangement and in fact in this case they would be 
willing to avoid certain areas/times of the year to avoid concentrations of juveniles and therefore discards 
(although temporary closures should/could be accompanied by increased access elsewhere). Loss of 
income through loss of juvenile catches is not stated as big loss and is easily compensated with some extra 
fishing. Apart from that they do not see the need for more selectivity increases or more selective gears, but 
they would not mind cleaner catches with less time lost in sorting and same or more profit.    
They take the attitude of why discard something that has a value (and in fact they say “everything has a 
price”) and/or why discard something that cannot be returned alive, while also taking the opposite stand “it 
is dead anyway and it will feed the fish and benthos and seabirds”. Their attitude towards discarding of 
commercial species over MLS (high grading) is somewhat different pre and post crisis but their criteria in 
both cases are financial not moral. Because of the crisis there is higher demand for cheaper fish there is less 
need for high grading and because there is crisis there are more poor people in need so there are a few 
tales about and a few documented cases of giving discards for free to the poor. There does not seem to be 
moral issues or reservations toward catch of turtles (returned alive), dolphins (?) and infrequently sharks 
(commercial and sold as such or for other look-alike commercial species). One of these sharks is the basking 
shark Cetorhinus maximus, included in the texts of Bern Convention, CITES and Barcelona Convention as 
strictly protected fauna species and in the List of endangered or threatened species, and currently assessed 
as threatened and listed as Vulnerable to extinction (IUCN Red List criteria, Cavanagh & Gibson 2007) (but 
main and historical culprit is drift netting and continued illegal drift netting). 
Thinking in ecological systems  
In agreement with the BS CS in general the interviewed fishers expressed an experience based thinking and 
understanding of the complex interaction between species and other natural conditions for the fisheries. 
They believe that the discarded material is not lost, but recycled either by marine fauna or by seabirds that 
will starve if they stopped discards and in that sense they are not wasted. They feel that their inputs and 
impact to the sea are less harmful than that of other human uses including agriculture, tourism/recreation 
and climate change with rising temperatures and spread of alien species. The increasing presence of the 
alien macrophyte Caulerpa racemosa, causing loss of habitat functions, and of the toxic fish Lagocephalus 
that that spreads undeterred as it has no enemies, are seen as the manifested result of lack of control on 
pressures (and state) of our seas. No mention however of some of the aliens (fish, molluscs, crabs and 
others) being established as of moderate commercial value for inshore coastal fisheries.  
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Economic approach to discards 
Even post-crisis, within an economic approach discard of non-commercial species and some low paid 
species was regarded as acceptable and good economy. Provided there is some form of compensation and 
appropriate infrastructure ashore and outlets (markets or uses) it was not regarded a total waste of space 
and fuel to land non-commercial species and organisms. Some fishers stressed practical problems of 
handling the volumes of “useless” material especially as the local authorities cannot even handle the 
volumes of litter that the fishers return as part of a voluntary clean up scheme.   
Political approach to discards 
In the biological and economic approach the fishers seem to regard discards as only a small problem, and 
increases in selectivity and changes in market demands contributed to reduced amounts. Seen from the 
fisher perspective discards is rather a political/legislative problem, i.e. through MLS prohibitions but these 
are not enforced or respected. Discarding is not a “live” big-deal issue on the Greek fishing political or 
moral agenda and indeed media coverage (shaping public opinion) usually focus on overfishing aspects, fish 
disappearing and reduced caches and income especially for coastal fishermen. This is very crudely 
corroborated by a simple keyword Google search in Greek language: overfishing and discards in Greek 
return 75200 and 21800 results respectively. Their contribution to overfishing is another matter and there 
they portrayed less favourably than the coastal fishermen. 
 
 
The fishers’ active steps to reduce or avoid discards 
The fishers’ passive steps to reduce discards are part of their compliance in using more selective gears and 
in fact more selective mesh size or mesh type. Implementation of these measures usually takes time (i.e. 
long delays are expected before full compliance) and these changes are not very often (previous change 
from 28 mm diamond mesh to 40 mm diamond was in 2001, and the most recent change from 40 mm 
diamond to 40 mm square or 50 mm diamond was regulated in 2006, with beginning of enforcing 
implementation 3-4 years ago in 2009-2010). While there are no fishers “active” steps to reduce discards, 
there are cases of avoidance of juveniles and of areas considered to have too much ‘’trash” messing up the 
catch or wasting time and money in sorting.  
Knowledge about fishing places etc. is not exchanged between the fishers in any configuration (social 
groups, ports etc.). VHF and cell phones are used for small talk and weather updates. On the contrary gear 
performance (pros/cons/specificities e.g. changes in durability or use of fuel) are discussed more openly at 
their unions and between them. The same is true for investments in equipment (winches, sonars, etc.). 
They do not talk about it and they are not interested in developing any technical solutions to reduce 
bycatch or discards. In addition their choice of gear is not influenced by selectivity/bycatch/discards, as it 
goes more or less with their strategic choice of investments (i.e. vessel type and size). 
 
 
Identity: The fishers are rough-handled/hard done and portrayed as responsible for overfished 
stocks 
In general the fishers feel they have “done what we were told to” every time over time: they are the most 
hard-done regulated part of the Greek fishing industry and they have sustained gear changes (new trawls 
with larger meshes), compulsory annual closures of 4 months, additional closed areas or zones or times, 
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electronic spying/recording by VMS, recent prohibitions of fishing on maerl/corraligene and on Posidonia 
meadows, and most importantly the recent loss of the fishing grounds between 1.0 and 1.5 n mile. The feel 
that coastal fishermen are much freer with much less prohibitions and controls but their political value (as 
voter power) is much higher as they are thousands (approx. 17000 vs. 300 trawlers) and their identity is 
perceived to be the traditional low impact low income one, although their share in the state of our fisheries 
and marine resources is perhaps considerable. 
They seem to be expecting to be able to arrange trade-offs i.e. more closed months should be followed by 
more open areas or subsidies. In general they hope there will not be any more measures despite 
overfishing signs but realistically expect more hard measures which they fear will drive the sector to its 
extinction as already they experiencing survival problems, a few of them faced with the financial crisis and 
VMS fines are hoping for subsidies to scrap their vessels.  
The identity as fisher was not an explicit theme during the interview. Most of the interviewed had been 
fishers all their life and came from fisher families – with references to fathers, uncles etc. as fishers. But no 
data were collected on how many of them had sons in the fishery. The coastal fishery sector is an aging 
sector with the younger generation not choosing the fishing profession but no data on the trawl sector. 
However the roles are different, in the trawl sector the Greek is usually the owner and Captain (a more of a 
white collar role than fish scale covered role) and the crew is usually Egyptians.   
 
 
Market 
The market is expected to be an important driver for discarding certain types of the catch for which there is 
no market at all or very low prices. But also there are cases, when if there is a market for e.g. undersized 
fish due to low enforcement and compliance they are landed, resulting in lower discarding. 
 
 
Value of landings in Greece 
The total annual gross income from capture fisheries per trawl vessel was 263569€ for vessels less than 24 
m and 430475€ for vessels more than 24 m length in the Aegean Sea. In the Ionian Sea these values were 
307025€ and 397633€, respectively (NSSG, 2008).   
The highest annual gross income per species per vessel for 2008 was attributed to Merluccius merluccius 
for both Aegean and Ionian Sea. In the Aegean Sea the annual income for the hake per vessel for vessels 
12-24 m were 61151€ and 108406€ for vessels >24 m. In the Ionian Sea these values were 87717€ and 
139462€, respectively. Mullus barbatus has also possessed a large proportion of the annual gross income in 
both seas. Cephalopods and mostly Loligo vulgaris had a large contribution to the total annual gross income 
in the Ionian Sea.   
 
 
Market related discard from Greek waters  
Based on the results from the Badminton project (Eliasen & Christensen 2012 and Catchpole 2012) one 
could expect market related discard of species with no market or with very low market price. The reason 
for discarding already caught marketable species is very small size below MLS or damaged specimens.  
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Considerations regarding Minimum Landing Sizes 
Generally Minimum Landing Sizes, MLS is regarded as a conservation measure aiming to protect juveniles 
till they reach their first sexual maturity. The fishers are obviously not happy with regulations that 
potentially force them to discard marketable fish, however MLS control is not actively enforced and in cases 
of certain at least target species landed specimens are of sizes smaller than the MLS. 
 Direct sales costs for low paid species  
The interviews revealed that in the middle of a financial crisis “everything has a price” and there is 
increased demand for some cheap species, which leads to less discarding. 
 
 
Interpretation of cost in relation to discard 
Not only the market prices, but also the cost (direct or indirect) influences the fishers’ interpretation of net 
income from handling the specific catch. Various factors seem to influence this: 
- Expected price at the market and income from sale for each species 
- Direct costs related to landing (sorting boxes, ice, auction and port charges) 
- The effort of handling/time spent sorting can in some instances be seen as indirectly too costly for 
some low paid species. The crew in charge of sorting the catch are typically foreigners (Egyptians) very 
experienced in this job with good knowledge of species and markets and under instructions from their 
captains what to keep or not at the beginning of the season or during special seasons; their pay is 
either with fixed salary or catch value shares. 
 
 
Technological investments 
In general most vessels are relative old while their average age was estimated at 22.63 years (Conides, 
2007). The larger recent investments include the new trawl (40 sq or 50 d mesh) and smaller investments/ 
any updates in sonars/plotters and trawl wires/doors etc. None of the investments are directly linked to the 
reduction of discards.  
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Introduction to the case study 
The third case has a quite different structure than the previous. The English case consists of three separate 
studies done on behalf of CEFAS with the purpose of “gain a deeper understanding and insight into the 
behaviours of fishermen, including the barriers, incentives, disincentives, rewards and opportunities for 
changing discarding behaviour” and to “identify effective mechanisms to facilitate behaviour change”.  The 
studies were in made 2009 and 2010 by “The social marketing gateway” (Prawn trawlers of North East of 
England) and Corporate culture (Devon Beam trawlers and nephrops trawlers of North West of England).  
The three studies was made in a social marketing approach focussed on understanding behaviour of fishers 
to gather their understanding of influences and drivers of discard and their eventual ideas for how to 
reduce discard. The data gathering was based on around 20 interviews with fishers and supplementing 
interviews with related persons or gate keeper to the fishers. The interview results were reported in three 
reports; “Scoping study: actionable insight into discarding behaviours of trawler men in the North East” 
(McArthur & Howick  2010), “Project 50 per cent. A Cefas project to reduce discards amongst Devon beam 
trawlers by 50%” (Corporate Culture 2009) and “Actionable insights into the discarding behaviours of 
fishermen in the North West. Final report to Cefas and Defra” (Corporate Culture 2010). 
As the focus and methodology was very close to the methodology of the WP 4, the reports describing the 
results have been used as the sources for the English case study. In this report we have extracted elements 
from the report to the list of potential factors for discard and a few lines describing the fishery in 
correspondence with the structure of the Danish and Greek cases.   
 
 
The nephrops trawl fishers of North East England 
The description is based on qualitative interviews with 30 respondents of which 22 were local fishermen 
and 8 other stakeholders, mainly gate keepers or contact persons to the fishers.   
The following are based on: McArthur & Howick 2010. Scoping study: actionable insight into discarding 
behaviours of trawler men in the North East.  
Table 1: The list of factors driving toward a higher or lower discard level 
 
Drivers for high discarding behaviour 
 
Drivers for selective/low(er) discarding 
behaviour 
Natural 
conditions 
 Incompatibility between the amount of 
fish caught (high) and the available 
quota (low) 
 Helps getting rid of Whiting that feed 
on and keep the Prawns away, thus 
contributing (in a small way) to 
creating ‘cleaner’ Prawn fishing.  
 
State  Low (and falling) quota allocation 
means the fish cannot be legally 
landed 
 Inflexibility in quota controls stops 
boats carrying forward unused 
monthly quota 
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 Inflexibility in the Track Record means 
that a boat’s quota does not reflect the 
mix of species that they currently catch  
 Strict application of / lack of flexibility 
in the Catch Composition rule means 
bi-catch is discarded even where there 
is enough quota 
 Severe costs and penalties associated 
with landing illegal fish 
 Tightening of Effort Control motivates 
the boats to fish harder when they are 
at sea to get higher return of limited 
days-at-sea  
 Restriction on the >10 meter boats 
carrying two nets prevents them from 
switching from a smaller to a larger net 
mesh size when fish are on the Prawn 
grounds 
 Not being able to purchase additional 
quota (only applies to <10 meter 
boats) 
Market  Increasing  economic pressures on the 
fishermen and decline of the fishing 
industry  
 High price of purchasing quota 
(compounded by the operation of 
‘slipper skippers’) compared to the 
expected market price for the fish 
 Lower costs – in time and fuel – than 
having to look elsewhere for areas 
with “cleaner” prawn grounds 
 A sense of economic waste associated 
with discarding fish that there would 
be a market for in e.g. catch 
composition regulation.  
 Catching less unwanted fish reduces 
net bulk which makes it easier to tow 
and therefore uses less fuel  
 Clean catches of prawn, where there is 
no discarding required, are of better 
quality and value 
 Blacking the fish and selling them 
illegally, where the expected price 
outweighs the risk of being caught 
Community  Resignation and pessimism that 
nothing will change, so ‘what’s the 
point’ of fishing more selectively 
 Staying on the right side of the law and 
avoiding prosecution associated with 
illegal landings 
  Recognition, e.g. being part of a 
sustainable fishing scheme (although 
few of the fishermen probable feel 
they can credibly be part of such a 
scheme due to the level of discarding 
they are involved in) 
 
 Using their knowledge of the sea to do 
the job well and ‘fishing normally’ in a 
balanced and sustainable way. (NB 
currently perceived to becoming less 
of an option due to Effort Control) 
 There is less work involved if you do 
not have to sort and dump the stock 
you cannot land.  
 Consensus across the fishermen that 
discarding is wrong and cannot be 
justified 
 A belief that the practice of discarding 
serves to undermine the sustainability 
of the local fishery and their future 
livelihood 
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 A suspicion that there may be 
unknown, negative environmental 
consequences associated with a high 
level of discarding 
 An appetite to try out new practical 
ideas that offer a realistic way of 
reducing discarding without adding 
costs or reducing income 
 A sense that discarding reinforces a 
negative public view of fishermen as 
being wasteful 
 
 
Natural conditions for the North Eastern English fishery 
The North Eastern English prawn fishery is mixed. Besides prawn, the main commercial species is whiting. 
Other fish species include cod, haddock, plaice and lemon sole. 
Whiting is perceived by the fishermen to be in high abundance (despite low quota), while the prawn stock 
is seen as diminishing. As whiting feed on prawn, the whiting abundance paired with restrictions on the 
fishing of this stock, is thought to pose a threat to the prawn stock. 
In order to target prawn all year round, while reducing the by-catch of whiting, some fishermen move out 
of their local fishing area in search for “cleaner” prawn grounds. 
The discard situation 
Previous research has estimated the level of discarding within the industry at around 50%. 
Discarding is recognised by the fishermen as being a significant problem, according to the fishermen mainly 
because the quotas were set too low in relation to the abundance of whiting.  
The fleet 
The local fleet numbers around 30 boats. Most of the skippers either own or part-own their boat. In recent 
years the size of the fleet has reclined now comprising fewer boats, with the smaller boats (<10m) 
representing a larger proportion of the fleet. Previously it was a more mixed fishery, but it is now moving 
towards a predominantly prawn trawling fishery. 
 
 
State: The regulation of the North eastern English fishery 
The quota system sets catch volume and catch composition. The catch composition depends on the day 
boarded, not what the composition is at the end of the trip. This means that catch with very low level of 
e.g. whiting one day cannot outweigh a high level of whiting the next day. This leads to discard of fish the 
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second day.2 The regulation also includes Days at Sea for vessels >10 meters and there is regulation on the 
types of gear allowed. The quota is distributed according to boats’ historical track records. 
Catch and quota development 
The boats often run out of whiting quota, and so try to either catch more prawns and/or buy whiting quota, 
which however is becoming increasingly expensive. 
Fisher consideration regarding control and legitimacy 
The whiting quota allocation is much criticized for being far below a reasonable level if compared with the 
whiting available, according to the fishermen’s experience3.  
External twin riggers are perceived to pose a threat to the local fishery by contributing to overfishing the 
prawn. There is thus a strong local support for tightening the control on twin rigs and possibly extend their 
limit to no closer than 12 miles from the coast. 
Control and enforcement of regulations and penalties are perceived by the fishers as being severe. 
 
 
Community 
The fishermen feel threatened by tightened regulation and economic pressures and are frustrated and 
worried about the sector’s future. 
Discard is widely believed by the fishermen as being morally wrong and potentially harmful to the marine 
ecology and the fishermen’s livelihood. However it is also perceived as an inevitable part of the fishing 
activity, due to the current low quota levels.  
The main reasons for discarding, according to fishermen, are: 
1. The quotas are too low compared with the stock abundance (especially for whiting) 
2. The implications of rules related to catch composition and effort regulation 
Fishermen responses aimed at limiting discarding: 
 Checking the market price (the price has a direct bearing on the decision whether to discard or not) 
 Using a square mesh size larger than the minimum required 
 Fishing lower - lowering the height of the net, to avoid by-catch of fish when fishing prawns 
 Trying to avoid areas with high density of fish (based on local knowledge 
 Fishing further out at sea 
Fishermen responses that do not limit the discarding: 
                                                          
2 ”The current Catch Composition rules for nephrops trawling, where the on board catch of Prawns and by-catch has 
to fit a certain ration, directly contributes to discarding. A relaxation of this rule so that it applied to landing or how 
Catch Composition is treated south of the 55 degree line (where Whiting is included with nephrops in the ration) 
would help make a difference” (McArthur & Howick 2010, p. 27). 
3 ”The key issue in the North East and the UK is insufficient Whiting quota to go around given existing fishing capacity. 
Other European countries, such as Norway and Sweden, are utilising very low levels of their Whiting quota. At the 
moment, the only way this could be shared/exchanged with the UK is through negotiation between countries at EU 
Commission level” (ibid: 28). 
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 Accepting discarding as inevitable 
 Landing illegally, selling on black market 
 
 
Market 
The boats often run out of whiting quota, and so they try to either catch more prawns and/or buy whiting 
quota, which however are becoming increasingly expensive. Whiting quota may cost £20 a box, yet the 
income for the fisher might be only £25 –at other, better times, the income might reach £50-60. 
The expected price has a direct bearing on the decision whether to discard or not. 
There are some illegal landings and a black market exists, but the extent is unknown. 
The local market is good for whiting and prawns, as well as cod, haddock, plaice and lemon sole, while 
other species caught in the area are more easily sold in ports further south.  
 
 
The prawn trawlers of North West England 
The interview persons for the study was 23 prawn fishers in the ports of Whitehaven and Maryport, and a 
number of local Cefas staff, local fisheries officers, a local NFFO representative and a local Defra policy 
official. 
The following are based on: Corporate Culture 2010: Actionable insights into the discarding behaviours of 
fishermen in the North West. Final report to Cefas and Defra . The Social Marketing Gateway. May 2010.  
Table 2: The list of factors driving toward a higher or lower discard level 
 Drivers for high discarding behaviour 
 
Drivers for selective/low(er) discarding 
behaviour 
Natural 
conditions 
• Changing stocks including more 
unusable fish such as juvenile plaice 
 In order to capture prawns in nets it is 
necessary to use relatively small mesh 
sizes, which means catching some 
levels of unwanted fish  
 
State  Unflexible net legislation (due to cod 
protection) means fishermen keep the 
small meshed prawn nets on all the 
time rather than changing according to 
the conditions 
 Monthly (instead of annual) quotas for 
cod and turbot would reduce their 
need to discard good marketable fish 
 Suggestion: Two hour restriction of 
trips might reduce discards (because 
short trips limits the discard biomass in 
the nets that blocks for “good” catches 
 Suggestion: extension of the in-shore 
zone would keep twin-riggers with 
much discards out 
Market  Expensive to invest in new more 
selective equipment 
 Increasing  economic pressures on the 
fishermen and decline of the fishing 
industry 
 Bad market value of dogfish of which 
 Catching less unwanted fish reduces 
net bulk which makes it easier to tow 
and therefore uses less fuel 
 Reduced level discards in the nets 
leads to better quality fish and thus 
higher profits 
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they catch many  Suggested incentive: Subsidies for new 
more selective gear and payment for 
participating in scientific trials 
 The species that are discarded are with 
no or very little market value (unlike 
the two other English cases), so there 
is genuine incentive to avoid catching 
them 
 Clean catches of Prawn, where there is 
no discarding required, are of better 
quality and value 
Community • Some believe that the juvenile plaice 
will never be bigger/mature (due to 
genetic or environmental factors), 
which removes the incentive to 
preserve them 
• Some not convinced of the benefits 
from technical or behavioural 
modifications (requests more 
evidence) 
• Some fishers had the experience that 
plaice swimming down when caught in 
the net, thus not using escape routes 
built into the nets 
 
 Acknowledgement that the stocks 
are declining and there is a need to 
protect them 
 Ideas for changes in practices that 
might reduce discards (using pots, 
escape hatches, nets without 
bridles, nets with separators, veil 
nets, limitations on braid size, 
limitations on diamond shape 
mesh) 
 Willingness to adopt new 
approaches and equipment 
 Widespread willingness to 
participate in and learn from 
technical trials (if not too costly for 
them) 
 There is less work involved if you 
do not have to sort and dump the 
stock you cannot land (particularly 
important because these were 
small scale boats where the 
owners also worked –so incentive 
to avoid hard unnecessary work) 
 A belief that the practice of 
discarding serves to undermine the 
sustainability of the local fishery 
and their future livelihood 
 Interest in participating in a 
“sustainable in-shore fisheries” 
programme 
 Heavy laden nets (with much 
discard material) are dangerous to 
tow 
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Natural conditions for the North Western English fishery 
The stocks are changing; especially the large scale cod stocks are disappearing. The remaining (few) cods 
are smaller. There are also decline of other large fish such as whiting, haddock, squid, monkfish, turbot and 
bill. More flat fish such as plaice, often juveniles on the prawn fishing grounds. Recently increase in herring 
stocks. These changes are the main reason fishermen have changed target species to prawns. 
Unlike the Devon and North East cases, the fishermen in this case did not believe that there were plenty of 
fish and thus understood the reason for many of the regulations. 
The discard situation 
Main species that are being discarded are juvenile plaice, dog fish (bad market), dabs (no market value) 
The fleet 
Prawn fishermen, most of them work in 2-3 man crews with a few of them working in crews larger than 3 
men. Small boats, mainly <12 meters. Around 22-23 boats fishing for prawns distributed in the 3 ports 
investigated. Mainly full-time fishermen. 
The fishery is under pressure due to changing fish stocks, rising fuel costs and declining fish prices. 
 
 
State: The regulation of the North Western English fishery 
Quota was not found to be a major issue in the NW prawn fishery, as they tended not to reach them due to 
bad weather, high fuel prices and low stocks. 
Catch and quota development 
For this part of the fleet the quota is not a limitation for the fishing activity. They claim not to be able to fish 
the whole allowable quota anyway.  
Fisher consideration regarding control and legitimacy 
Contrary to the findings in the Devon case, the fishermen in this study tended to have good relations with 
the fisheries officers. 
 
 
Community 
Fishermen attitudes towards discards: they recognise it as a problem because they lead to:  
• Unwanted, unprofitable, hard and sometimes dangerous work. 
• The fishermen do not like to kill unnecessarily 
• Discarding is seen as endangering future stocks and thus their livelihood 
There is a relatively close cooperation between the fishermen in the group. They are not well represented 
in national organisations and feel competition from the Irish twin-rigger fleets which fishing at the nearby 
fishing grounds with a high catch and discards. 
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Interestingly, the fishermen in this case did not feel under pressure from environmentalists or a bad public 
reputation. Rather a feel that there is too little public attention on their fishery, so that they were forgotten 
in political negotiations. 
The fishers claim interest in participating in a “sustainable in-shore fisheries” programme. 
 
 
Market 
No mentioning of a black market for illegally landed fish. The bad market for dogfish is a major reason for 
the discard of this species. 
 
 
The beam trawlers of Devon 
The interview persons for the Devon study was 13 beam trawlers (fishermen, skippers), 13 owners and 
industry leader and CEFAS researchers, industry leaders, fishery officers, Defra policy officials. 
The following are based on Corporate Culture 2009: Project 50 per cent. A Cefas project to reduce discards 
amongst Devon beam trawlers by 50 %. Social Marketing Research Report 2009 
Table 3: The list of factors driving toward a higher or lower discard level 
 
 
Drivers for high discarding behaviour 
 
Drivers for selective/low(er) discarding 
behaviour 
Natural 
conditions 
 Incompatibility between the amount of 
fish caught (high) and the available 
quota (low) 
 A belief that most of the discarded fish 
and other species survive 
 
 
State  Low (and falling) quota allocation 
means the fish cannot be legally 
landed 
 Strict enforcement and policing 
attitude of authorities is detrimental to 
the relationship with the fishers  
 Compensation such as additional 
quotas or days at sea would give 
incentives to adapt more selective 
fishing practices 
Market  Increasing  economic pressures on the 
fishermen and decline of the fishing 
industry  
 High price of purchasing quota and 
uncertainty whether changing EU 
decisions will make investments 
worthwhile 
 A sense of economic waste associated 
with discarding fish that there would 
be a market for.  
 Catching less unwanted fish reduces 
net bulk which makes it easier to tow 
and therefore uses less fuel and 
requires less sorting work 
 Awareness of consumer demand for 
fish from sustainable fisheries 
 
Community  Resignation and pessimism that 
nothing will change, so ‘what’s the 
point’ of fishing more selectively 
 Consensus that discarding is wasteful 
and that certain types may be 
ecologically detrimental 
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 Conviction that the science is “wrong” 
and there are plenty of sole 
 Interest in learning from technical 
trials on how to reduce discarding and 
demand for higher accessibility of such 
knowledge 
 A sense that discarding reinforces a 
negative public view of fishermen as 
being wasteful 
 
 
Natural conditions for the Devon beam trawl fishery 
According to the fishermen interviewed the sole stock is in high abundance, but following natural 
fluctuations. They believe the science showing low abundance is flawed (partly due to “cheating” of the 
industry in the past), and hence that quotas are too low. 
 
 
The discard situation 
The report does not mention the average discard level. It is mentioned that at vessel or trip level the 
catches contain between 10 % and 70 % discards. 
Fishermen attitudes towards discarding:  
It is important to distinguish between discards if benthos (unmarketable fish and shellfish, debris, sea 
anemones and decaying matter), juveniles fish and over quota fish. The fishermen perceive discards due to 
quota restrictions a waste. As catching juveniles is recognised as being harmful to the stock, these are only 
caught as by-catch, and must be discarded due to MLS regulations. Avoiding benthos would be an 
advantage. There is thus a positive attitude towards lowering discards. However, they would expect to be 
compensated by additional quota or days at sea in return for adopting measures aimed at reducing 
discards. 
The fishermen are convinced that a high proportion of the discarded fish and other species survive, as they 
do not appear in the catches. 
The quota system and the Single License Agreement is perceived as causing discards, which has become 
inevitable due to further quota restrictions. They believe that it is impossible for them to avoid species for 
which they do not have quota. 
They are generally positive towards using nets with larger mesh size, but they need the flexibility to carry 
different types of nets for different areas. 
The fleet 
Beam trawlers. Main target species is sole. 
 
 
State: The regulation of the Devon beam fishery 
Regulation mentioned in the report: The Quota system; a Single Licence Agreement which means that the 
fishers have to go back to port and register catches from one fishing area, before going out to another area 
to catch more fish and regulation of days at sea. 
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Communication:  
The Devon fishery has a strong connection with one producer organization, but not so much with the NFFO, 
which is the main national industry body that consults with the authorities. The Devon fishery therefore 
feels excluded from the consultation process. 
There have been different kinds of trials with mesh size and shape carried out in Devon, but the fishermen 
feel that the results have not been widely shared and technical guidance is lacking on how to reduce 
discards. 
Catch and quota development 
EU meeting in 2006 resulted in a lowering of the quota, particularly of sole. 
Fisher considerations regarding control and legitimacy 
The fishermen feel that the act of buying quota is risky, as they cannot predict whether such purchase will 
pay off, or whether a new EC decision might suddenly cut off quotas for their most important fishing 
ground. On the other hand the quota system forces the fishermen to be flexible, swapping and renting 
quota and fishing grounds. The find that they have to go out further than before in order to make up for 
lost income in the local areas. 
The fishermen are highly critical of the Single Licence Agreement, which makes their work less efficient. 
 
 
Community 
Crew skippers and owners agree that: 
• Fishing is not an exact science –lots of “trying areas out” and moving around required (also for 
experienced fishers). 
• Seeing themselves as part of an innocent and ancient tradition, honest and benefiting the 
community (food and jobs) and the fishing grounds (good to be ploughed). “Custodians” of the 
grounds. 
• Internal community feeling, supporting each other (not competing –which is contrary to previous 
findings. 
• The Devon fishermen do not feel represented in NFFO, the national industry organisation, and thus 
feel excluded from consultation processes between the authorities and the industry 
• Worried: Participating in a financially precarious and dangerous occupation 
• Too much control 
• Fishermen are (wrongly) being seen as criminals. Feel they are scapegoats 
• Belief that there are plenty of fish –when stocks are apparently declining it is due to natural 
fluctuation   
 
